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CIRCUIT SPLITTING AND THE "NEW"
NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS:
CAN THE MOUSE ROAR?
by
Charles R. Haworth*
"The commission labored mightily, but produced only a mouse."'

Late in 1972 two events occurred that have had a significant impact on
the continuing debate on the possible cures for the congestion problems
that confront the federal court appellate system. 2 First, in October 1972

Congress established the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System (the Commission).3 The Commission4 was charged

with suggesting changes in boundaries for the United States Courts of
Appeals and changes in the structure or internal procedures of those

courts in order to expedite business. 5 Second, in December 1972 the
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Professor of Law, Washington University, St.
Louis, Mo. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Clyde Sorrell, J.D., University of
Virginia, and Barbara Paddock, J.D., Washington University, for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I. Miller, Supreme Court: Time for Reforms, The Washington Post, Jan. II, 1976, at Fl,
col. 4.
2. For review of those problems and earlier suggested solutions see Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law,
82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257; Wiener, Federal Regional Courts: Solution for the
Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in
Judicial Administration, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 949 (1964).
3. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp.
V, 1975). The amendment dealt only with lengthening the time within which the Commission was
to file its final report and increasing the appropriation from $270,000 to not more than $606,000.
4. Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1. The members were appointed in equal numbers by the four major
branches of the federal government. The President appointed Emanuel Cellar, Roger C.
Crampton, Francis R. Kirkham, and Alfred T. Sulmonetti. The Chief Justice appointed J.
Edward Lumbard, Roger Robb, Bernard G. Segal, and Herbert Wechsler. The President pro
tempore of the Senate appointed Quentin N. Burdick, Edward Gurney (later replaced by Hiram
L. Fong), Roman L. Hruska, and John L. McClellan. The Speaker of the House appointed Jack
Brooks, Walter Flowers, Edward Hutchinson, and Charles E. Wiggins. A. Leo Levin was
appointed Executive Director.
5. Id. Unfortunately, Congress did not also deem it appropriate for the Commission to
study and make recommendations on the jurisdiction of the federal district courts with a view to
recommending abolition of federal jurisdiction in classes of cases, such as diversity, or to reform
some excesses in those courts' general jurisdiction. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1457, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972); Hruska, The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System: A
Legislative History, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579, 602-03 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
Neither the Commission nor witnesses before it questioned the existence of this limitation. See,
e.g., 2 Hearings before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Second Phase 1975) 696, 805, 1026-27 [hereinafter cited as Commission Hearings] (Aldisert,
Coffin, Neal). This omission was unfortunate for fat exists in the intake of cases into the federal
court system. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973)
[hereinafter cited as H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION]. At first glance this failure of
Congress to study ways to avert the flow of cases into federal courts, cf. Friendly, Averting the
Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974), made it difficult to evaluate the
desirability of the Commission's bifurcated proposals in the absence of firm figures with which to
deal. 1975 Commission Hearings 924-25. Upon reconsideration now four years after the establishment of the Commission and longer still after impassioned pleas for relief from congestion in
the federal system by numerous federal judges, see Hearing on S.J. Res. 122 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as S.J. Res. 122 Hearing], it appears that Congress is
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Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court (the Study Group)6
issued its report. The Study Group was charged with studying the
caseload of the Supreme Court "and to make such recommendations as
its findings warranted." 7 The Study Group's final report proposed a wide
variety of remedies for the problems with the workload of the Court, but
sparked a lengthy, acrimonious debate only on whether to establish a
National Court of Appeals with the power of final review over most cases

in the federal system.8
In 1973 the Commission issued the first installment of a suggested
two-step approach to the problems of the courts of appeals. Both the

Fifth and Ninth Circuits would be split to create two new courts.9 The
second report of the Commission showed the profound effect the debate

on the Study Group's proposal had on the work of the Commission.
Although the primary recommendation of the Study Group has been
reduced "to a residue of embers in legal journals,"' 0 that proposal, the
response to it, and an assessment of the lessons learned during the debate
guided the Commission in reaching a final recommendation: the creation
of a "new" National Court of Appeals. I The Commission also proposed, in
response

to criticism

by lawyers

and scholars

of

existing prac-

tices in the courts of appeals, enlarging the scope of oral argument and
opinion-writing. 12 Finally, in an effort to achieve reform, the Commission recommended a major readjustment in federal-state court relations: the review of state supreme court decisions by an inferior federal court. 3
Unfortunately for advocates of reform, the Commission's "mouse"
did not arouse the "cat's" vigilant guard of the status quo. The quiet has
been devastating. 4 The expected debate has not materialized, perhaps
unlikely to do anything significant to avert the flood of cases in the district courts, in spite of
constant urgings of the Chief Justice. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 96
S. Ct. Adv. Sh. No. 9 (1976).
6. The members of this group were Paul A. Freund, Chairman, Alexander M. Bickel, Peter
D. Ehrenhaft, Russell D. Niles, Bernard G. Segal, Robert L. Stern, and Charles A. Wright. They
were appointed by the Chief Justice as Chairman of the Federal Judicial Center.
7. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court ix (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Study Group].
8. Id. at 18-24.
9. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 8, 13
(1973), in 62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL
BOUNDARIES].

10. Leventhal, A Modest Proposal For a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
881, 889-90 (1975).
11. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE Vii-viii (1975), in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199
(1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION, STRUCTURE].

12. Id. at 46-53, 67 F.R.D. at 247-60.
13. Id. at 32, 67 F.R.D. at 227.
14. To date only twelve articles have dealt with the Commission's report. Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Establish a National Court of Appeals, 7 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 431 (1976); Feinberg, A NationalCourt of Appeals?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 611
(1976); Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between FederalJudicial Circuits, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 1188 (1974); Hruska, The National Court of Appeals: An Analysis of Viewpoints, 9
CREIGHTON L. REV. 286 (1975); Hruska, Commission Recommends New National Court of
Appeals, 61 A.B.A.J. 819 (1975); Legislative History 579; Leventhal, supra note 10; Levin, Do
We Need a New NationalCourt?, 12 TRIAL, Jan. 1976, at 32; Levin & Fickler, Realignment of the
Fifth Circuit: A Necessary First Step, 46 Miss. L.J. 659 (1975); Owens, The Hruska Commission's Proposed National Court of Appeals, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 580 (1976); Rosenberg,
Enlarging the Federal Courts' Capacity to Settle the National Law, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 709
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because no group or institution feels very threatened or because no
reform will occur until after the 1976 elections. Thus, the Commission's
recommendations seem headed, except for the Fifth Circuit split, for the
same fate as that of the Study Group: one beaten to death and the other
stillborn. With the hope that the mouse can be made to roar, this Article
will examine the Commission's proposals and congressional reaction to
circuit-splitting, the creation of a National Court of Appeals, oral argument
and opinion writing, and National Court of Appeals' review of state
court appeals. The thesis of this Article is that splitting the Fifth Circuit is
necessary, that the problems generated by adding new courts of appeals
can be alleviated by creating a National Court of Appeals, and that
adding new courts will help solve the increasingly inaccessible and silent
nature of the courts of appeals. The price of these reforms need not
include reordering the division of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts.
I.

THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

The courts of appeals are experiencing extremely serious congestion
problems. One happy note may, however, be sounded: in contrast to the
disagreement about the Supreme Court workload, no one, not even
Justice Douglas, disputes that those courts are indeed surfeited.1 5 One
difficulty in proposing comprehensive solutions for the problems of the
courts of appeals is that any acceptable plan must not only cure that
problem, but also must have narrow ramifications for the remaining parts
of the presently three-tiered federal court system. Armed with the
limited mandate to study geographical boundaries first, the Commission
began work.
A.

The Problem

Commentators often refer to the problem of congestion in the courts of
appeals as a crisis. i 6 A brief summary will highlight the situation. In 1961
the courts of appeals, operating with 78 authorized judgeships, had 4,204
case filings.1 7 By 1968, despite only a modest increase in the number of
filings at the district court level,' 8 filings to the courts of appeals more
than doubled to 9,116.19 By 1975, although Congress had increased the
number of authorized judgeships to 97, case filings increased to 16,658.20
Thus, over the fifteen-year period from 1961 to 1975, total filings
(1975); Commission Recommends Splitting Fifth and Ninth Circuits to Create Two New Federal
Appellate Circuits, 60 A.B.A.J. 209 (1974). Six were authored by members of the Commission or
its staff.
15. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 176 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. See Carrington, supra note 2; Haworth, supra note 2; Wright, supra note 2.
17.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, Table 2, at

175 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A.O. ANN. REP. for the respective year]. All references are to
fiscal years unless otherwise indicated.
18. In 1961 a total of 88,561 cases were filed in the district courts. By 1968 the total had only
increased to 102,163. A.O. ANN. REP. 107, 117 (1968).
19. A.O. ANN. REP. table B-I, at 174 (1968).

20. A.O. ANN. REP. table B-I, at 323 (1975).
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increased almost 300 percent, and in just the eight-year period from 1968
to 1975 filings per authorized judgeship increased 83 percent. 2'

Figures alone do not tell the whole story, but two additional statistics
lay the basis for additional concern. In 1968 the courts of appeals left
6,615 cases pending; by 1975 that number had grown to 12,128.22 This

increase occurred despite almost doubling the number of case terminations
per judgeship over that period.2 3 Second, terminations in 1975 increased only 3.7 percent over 1974, with the District of Columbia, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits showing declines in terminations .24 The dramatic increases
in productivity may have come to an end. 25 If so, the courts of appeals may
have difficulty continuing to cope with their ever-increasing workload and
backlog, 26 absent amelioration of the current jurisdictional structure, court
structure, or the manner of hearing and determining cases.
The traditional approaches to congestion have included creating new

levels of courts,27 appointing more judges,28 tightening jurisdictional

requisites, 29 urging judges to work harder and dispose of more cases ,30

and importing modern office techniques and human assistance into the

judicial process. 31 More importantly, the courts of appeals over the last
eight years have tended to cut the burden and speed the process by
hearing fewer oral arguments, writing more per curiam opinions, and
21. A.O. ANN. REP. table 25, at 181 (1974); A.O. ANN. REP. table 1, at 174 (1975).
22. A.0. ANN. REP. table I, at 174 (1975).
23. Terminations increased from 8,264 in 1968 to 16,000 in 1975. Id.
24. Id.at 173.
25. It is difficult to say how much excess capacity existed in the circuit courts in 1962 when
the average disposition rate was 53 cases per judge. A.O. ANN. REP. table 2, at 99 (1971). One
judge candidly admitted that when he was first appointed the caseload was cleared during the
summer. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing97 (Brown). Those days are now gone. Regardless, the change to
165 dispositions per judgeship, A.O. ANN. REP. table 3, at 178 (1975), has undoubtedly caused
heavy burdens on the judges, with resulting unfortunate side effects. See note 35 infra and
accompanying text.
26. Few bright spots appear in the statistics. The district courts, after some encouraging
signs of decreased activity, had a 13.3% increase in filings of civil cases and 8.9% of criminal.
A.O. ANN. REP. 191, 250 (1975). Most troublesome, however, is that during 1972, 1973, and 1974,
although the number of terminations by district courts had been declining slightly, the number of
filings in the circuit courts continued to rise, although only by 1.4% in 1975. A.O. ANN. REP. 173
(1975). The increasing tendency for losers to appeal, rather than the usual theories of increased
population and litigation, would seem to account for a significant part of the courts' problems.
Judge Friendly noted this trend and pinpointed as the chief culprits both increased criminal
appeals, in which the Government pays the costs, and the conversion of cases from dollars to
principles. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 32-33. Judge Friendly also warns of additional
troubles ahead as Congress, properly so, directs more appeals to the courts of appeals first, rather
than directly to the Supreme Court. Id. at 33-34. Also, a significant boom in social security and
other public welfare cases, forecast in Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of FederalAdministrativeAction: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. I, 25 (1975), to reach perhaps
1,000 cases per year, began to show up in 1974 as social security cases increased 27.5% (from 193
to 246). A.O. ANN. REP. table 28, at 188 (1974). That figure held steady for 1975, A.O. ANN. REP.
180 (1975), but those cases seem to be simply caught in a logjam in the district courts since
pending social security cases in those courts rose 65% from 1974. Id.at 201.
27. See, e.g., Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (The Evarts Act)
(federal system); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.301-321 (Supp. 1976) (state system).
28. Authorized federal district judgeships now total 400. A.0. ANN. REP. 188 (1975). The
courts of appeals now have 97 authorized active judgeships. Id. at 174. Bills pending before
Congress would increase these numbers by as many as 13 more appellate judgeships and 52 more
district judgeships. See H.R. 4422, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (appellate); H.R. 4421, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (district).
29. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
30. Haworth, supra note 2, at 262.
31. The increasing importance of staff is detailed in D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF
AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974).
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disposing of cases without a written opinion. 2 Each of the solutions has a
peculiar drawback. More judges may be a practical solution at the trial
level, but the difficulties attending an increase in appellate judges may be
insurmountable. 33 Limiting the flow of cases nearly always runs into
opposition from interest groups that want to retain jurisdiction over
particular specialties or from those who view the state and federal
systems as basically unitary. 34 Pressing the judges to do more may finally
have reached the maximum point of efficiency, and the workload plus
allegedly inadequate pay has already produced unfortunate resignations
from the bench. 35 Systems and staff are important and helpful, but we
should cling to the expectation that judges do their own work. Finally,
procedural shortcuts have risks and shortcomings that will be discussed
36
in more detail later in this Article.
B.

The Solution-Phase One

The first charge to the Commission was to study the "geographical
boundaries" of the courts of appeals and to recommend any appropriate
changes. 37 Congress ordered, and received, a report within 180 days of
the appointment of the Commission's ninth member. One approach the
Commission could have taken was to consider itself a constitutional
convention for circuit boundaries and redraw circuit lines to equalize the
burden of appeals and dispositions per judgeship across the entire
country. This approach would have made a great deal of sense in a
system that began with three judges per circuit court38 but now ranges
from fifteen in the Fifth to three in the First, 39 and 219 filings per judge in
the Fifth to 124 in the District of Columbia. 4° The Commission declined to
take this approach, citing the unsettling effect on circuit law that would
result from a general realignment and a reluctance to disturb the "sense
4
of community shared by lawyers and judges within the present circuits." 1
The Commission might have also concluded that a general realignment undoubtedly would have brought down a hail of negative
reaction from the bench and bar that would have doomed the plan
politically. So the Commission turned to the most likely candidates, the
32. See generally Haworth, supra note 2.
33. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has disclaimed any desire for more judges. A.O. ANN.
REP. 81-82 (1971).
34.

See S. REP. No. 94-513, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1975) ("[Congress] should not forego

. . . enforcement or protection [of federal or constitutional rights] merely because additional
cases will be brought into the courts."); Carrington, Book Review, in 4 Appellate Justice: 1975,
Materials for a National Conference, San Diego, California, January 23-25, 1975, at 18, 20
[hereinafter cited as Appellate Justice: 1975]; Frank, Book Review, 59 A.B.A.J. 466 (1973)
("Solutions do not lie in moving the load from one pile to another.").
35. For instance, Griffin B. Bell of Atlanta, only 57 years old, recently resigned his circuit
judgeship after nearly 15 years on the bench to return to private practice. The Atlanta Journal,

Jan. 30, 1976, at I. This resignation apparently had no connection with his recent appointment to
the post of Attorney General. Forty-four federal judges recently sued the United States for
damages and to force a pay increase. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1976, at 1, col. I.
36. See part Ill infra.
37. Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1(a), 86 Stat. 807 (1972).
38. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (The Evarts Act).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
40. A.O. ANN. REP. table 3, at 178 (1975).
41.

COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 3, 62 F.R.D. at 228.
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three largest circuits in terms of case filings per year: the Second, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits.42 Each of these courts was attempting to cope with
the overload with procedures that are troubling to the bar. The Second
Circuit allows oral argument in every case, but has greatly increased the
number of dispositions by an oral decision from the bench or a brief
unpublished memorandum.43 The Fifth Circuit denies oral argument in
more than half its cases and disposes of almost forty percent without
written opinion of any kind other than the simple notation "Affirmed. [or
Enforced.] See Rule 21."" In the Ninth Circuit the backlog of civil cases
has reached the point that two years may elapse between the time of filing
45
the last brief and the time of oral argument.
The Commission decided to do nothing to the Second Circuit. Witnesses
before the Commission opposed any change in the composition of the
states that currently comprise the Second Circuit. 46 Indeed, the resultant
decision of the Commission was not surprising considering the great
hostility toward creating a one-state circuit consisting only of New York
and the slight additional burden imposed on that circuit by the two other
47
states in the circuit.

Turning then to the Fifth Circuit, the Commission found more fertile
ground. The circuit is huge both in terms of geography and caseload. This
size coincides with controversial procedural innovations designed to
cope with a rising caseload, 48 a unanimous position by the judges against
42. In 1975 the Fifth Circuit had 3,292 cases commenced; the Ninth Circuit 2,731; and the
Second 1,739. A.O. ANN. REP. 324-26 (1975).
43. In 1966 the Second Circuit decided 60 cases, or 14.1% of its total terminations, from
the bench; in 1973 the numbers had grown to 284 cases, or 35.8% of total dispositions. 1973
Commission Hearings, table 9, at 1052; id. table 8, at 1051 (Kaufman).
44. In 1974 the Fifth Circuit classified as Class II cases (no oral argument) 1,028 cases, or
54.9% of the cases screened. That same year the number of cases decided under rule 21
without written opinion totaled 633 or 34.9% of total cases disposed of after hearing and
submission. 1975 Commission Hearings 883, 892 (Brown). After 9 months of 1975 the rule 21
cases were running at a rate of 38.6%. Id. at 892. In 24% of the Fifth Circuit's dispositions
there is no oral argument and no written opinion. Hearings on S. 2988, S. 2989, S.2990 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2988]; 1973 Commission
Hearings 520 (Brown). For a discussion of the rule 21 procedure see Haworth, supra note 2, at
271-74.
45. 1973 Commission Hearings 727 (Wright). The basic problems for civil litigants in the
Ninth Circuit are the priority given to criminal cases and the screening procedure to which
civil cases are subjected. Id. at 724, 823 (Wright, Kilkenny).
46. See 1973 Commission Hearings 1031 (Kaufman).
47. The other states in the Second Circuit are Vermont and Connecticut, which contributed
in 1973 only 2.1% and 10.5%, respectively, of the appeals to the court. 1973 Commission
Hearings, graph C, at 1061 (Kaufman).
Another factor in the Commission's decision was the evidence of relatively high acceptance
of the procedure of affirming cases orally from the bench after oral argument. See 1973
Commission Hearings 1072-79, 1120 (Silverman, Bamberger); Drury, Goodman & Stevenson,
Attorney Attitudes Toward Limitation of Oral Argument and Written Opinion in Three
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Drury, Attorney Attitudes]. This survey indicated that this practice was acceptable to 72% of
the Second Circuit lawyers, but was acceptable to only 52% of Fifth Circuit lawyers and 53%
of Sixth Circuit lawyers. Id. at 19. Interestingly, this practice, as a method to speed
disposition, had better acceptance among Second Circuit lawyers than denial of oral argument, of
which only 67% of Second Circuit lawyers, as- opposed to 84% of Fifth Circuit
lawyers, found acceptable. Id. The surveyors linked this acceptance to familiarity with the
practice examined. Id. at 20-21. Second Circuit lawyers tend to accept oral dispositions
perhaps because they are more familiar with that extensive practice.
48. See note 44 supra.
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meeting that caseload with additional judgeships,4 9 a majority of its own
members in favor of splitting the circuit,50 and predictions of backlogs
developing." These problems are not new in the Fifth Circuit. As early as
1950, a commentator noted the rising caseload and suggested dividing the

circuit into two three-state circuits.5 2 Thus, no surprise was discernible
when the Commission recommended creating a new Eleventh Circuit
comprised of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone, with
the diminished Fifth Circuit to retain Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. 3
The proposal has a number of favorable features: the caseload would be
evenly balanced between the two circuits;54 no two-state or one-state

circuit would be created; no other circuit's composition would be disturbed;
the states are contiguous; each of the circuits would apparently contain "a diversity of population, legal business, and socio-economic inter49. See resolution adopted in October 1971, reproduced in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 28-29, 1971. In 1971 the Fifth

Circuit had 2,316 filings. A.O. ANN. REP. 243 (1971). Filings for 1975 totaled 3,292, A.O. ANN.
REP. 325 (1975), an increase of 41.7% with no increase in judges.
50. See Written Joint Statement of Hon. Walter P. Gewin, Hon. Lewis R. Morgan, Hon.
Charles Clark, Hon. James P. Coleman, Hon. John C. Godbold, Hon. David W. Dyer, Hon.
Bryan Simpson, Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1973.
Commission Hearings 392-95. Chief Judge Brown has referred to this document as a
"manifesto from the East" since there is a notable lack of signers from Texas and Louisiana.
Hearings on S. 2988, at 78. In fact, the only expression of sentiment for a split from the west
has come from Judge Ingraham of Houston, who has since taken senior status. Id. at 120. This
division of opinion is not readily explainable and at least on the surface has nothing to do with
the Mississippi problem to be discussed later. See text accompanying notes 102-16 infra. The
judges, of course, express nothing but regard and affection for one another. See, e.g., 1973
Commission Hearings 400 (Gewin). One must wonder if some other reason might underlie the
division of opinion.
51. Hearings on S. 729 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 729].
52. The suggestion was to create a new Eleventh Circuit comprised of Florida, Georgia,
Alabama, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The newly constituted Fifth Circuit would
consist of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone. Wahl, The Case for an 11th
Court of Appeals, 24 FLA. L.J. 233, 234 (1950). In 1964 the Judicial Conference approved the
report of a special committee that recommended splitting the circuit. 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT 14-15. The proposal was to create a new Eleventh Circuit comprised of Texas,
Louisiana, and the Canal Zone. That proposal at a time of serious social upheaval in the South
was viewed with what can charitably be described as suspicion and generated adverse
commentary outside of judicial and academic circles. See Wright, supra note 2, at 955, quoting
Editorial, The Washington Post, May 29, 1964, at A18, col. 1, and Christian Science Monitor,
April 20, 1964, at 7, col. 3, which both questioned the wisdom of the creation of what was
viewed as a Deep South Circuit from which racial liberals John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana
and John R. Brown of Texas would be noticeably absent. Judge Brown recalls:
[W]e reached the conclusion as a court. . . that this [realignment] seemed to be
inevitable. . . . [Wle first took the view that the judges ought not to have
anything to do at all with the possible realinement [sic], the geographic nature of
it, because with school cases and other voter registration cases and race cases
then very much alive, any selection of States was then demonstrably selecting the
outcome of cases because of the demonstrated actions of the particular judges.
So, we thought that had to be left to somebody else.
Two of our judges, Judge Rives and John Minor Wisdom, had second thoughts
about this. And Judge Wisdom was largely responsible for getting the Judicial
Conference of the United States to change its mind. And this was done, I think,
essentially because we could see the disturbing consquences of any circuit
realignment of the six States in terms of the outcome of very sensitive cases.
S.J. Res. 122 Hearings 107-08. The debates on the Evarts Act in 1891 show similar proposals
being offered. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 586 n. 197.
53. COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 9, 62 F.R.D. at 232.
54. Using the figures for 1973 and apportioning administrative appeals, the numbers
looked like this:

846
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ests"; and, at the time of the report, neither circuit would have required more
than nine judges.55
The Commission also attempted to deal with the Ninth Circuit, but
encountered a more complicated problem. Although the Ninth Circuit 5is6
geographically huge, 64.2 percent of the cases come from California.
Even to approximate a balanced caseload after division of the circuit
would require either creating a one-state circuit or placing part of
California in one circuit and the rest in another. Either alternative had
obvious unpalatable features, but the Commission opted for the California
58
split. 57 The reaction from California was immediate and negative.
59
Despite extensive legislative efforts to meet objections to the proposal,
the Senate dropped an attempt to solve the California problem.
Fifth Circuit
Florida
Georgia
Alabama

800
451
249
1,500

Eleventh Circuit
Texas
Louisiana
Mississippi
Canal Zone

838
477
143
6
1,464

Id.
55. The proposal satisfies all the Commission's general criteria for circuit realignment.
The five criteria are: (1)Circuits should be composed of at least three states; no one-state
circuits should be created. (2) No circuit should be created that would immediately require
more than nine judges. (3) A circuit should contain states with a diversity of population, legal
business, and socio-economic interests. (4) Avoid excessive interference in established
circuit alignment. (5) No circuit should contain noncontiguous states. Id. at 7, 62 F.R.D. at
231-32.
56. Hearings on S. 729, at 127 (Chambers) (circuit executive figures).
57. The extensive analysis of the consequences of the split by the Commission's
executive director probably helped tip the balance. See Hellman, supra note 14. The proposed
realignment was as follows:
Twelfth Circuit
California-Southern
California-Central
Arizona
Nevada

998
234
70

New Ninth Circuit
California-Northern
California-Eastern
Alaska
Washington
Oregon
Idaho
Montana
Hawaii
Guam

545
26
183
121
30
36
38
35

1,014
1,302
COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 13, 62 F.R.D. at 236.
58. See, e.g., Speech of Warren Christopher to the Chancery Club of Los Angeles, March
1974, in Hearings on S. 2988, at 180-85.
59. See S. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill introduced the "division" concept
into circuit-splitting proposals, partly in response to the incredible argument from judges of
the Fifth Circuit over which new court would retain the designation "Fifth," see Hearingson
S. 2988, at 87, 108-09, but basically to meet the problem of possible conflicts on questions of
both state and federal law potentially arising from splitting California. The bill provided for a
special limited joint en banc hearing before the most senior judges of the two divisions, S.729,
supra, § 11,whenever there was a "conflict with a decision by the other division of that circuit
and affecting the validity, construction, or application of any statute or administrative order,
rule, or regulation, State or Federal, which affects personal or property rights in the same
State." Id. § 25. A side benefit of the division concept was to ease the intercircuit assignment
problem of district and circuit judges from one division to another as caseload demanded. Id.
§§ 12, 13. In a nod to the supposed continued unity of the new courts, the courts could convene
in one judicial conference. Id. § 20. In all other respects, the division concept effectively
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Reaction of Congress

The Senate Judiciary Committee substituted and recommended passage of

S. 2752, which treats only the Fifth Circuit,' for the original bill,
S.729, which dealt with both circuits. In S.2752 the Judiciary Committee
rejected in two respects the Commission's recommended division of the
Fifth Circuit. First, the Commission's second alternative proposal 61 for

the alignment of Mississippi with the states to the east rather than with

Texas and Louisiana was adopted. 62 Second, the Canal Zone was
assigned to the eastern states. 63 Also, the bill, instead of naming one of

the new circuits the "Eleventh,"

divides the existing Fifth Circuit into

eastern and western divisions.4 The bill would create eight new circuit
judgeships, five in the western division and three in the eastern division.
Total authorized judgeships would be 11 in the west and 12 in the east,
65
with a per judge caseload of 141 and 145, respectively.

Senate Bill 2752 appears simply to create "divisions" within the Fifth
Circuit, but the effect is far deeper than merely placating those judges
who protested the loss of the designation "Fifth."- 66 In fact, a new court
is created that for any major purpose is as separate as the First and Ninth

Circuits. 67 Each division would have a separate chief judge, circuit
executive, headquarters, and judicial council. 68
accomplished creation of new circuit courts. It would seem that a convincing argument could
be made that California, Nevada, and Arizona, with combined filings in 1975 of 1,710 cases
(exclusive of administrative appeals), would make a manageable-sized circuit. The Second
Circuit had 1,739 cases filed in 1975, and although it has manpower available from senior
judges, the three-state circuit created out of the Ninth could be manned with more than nine
judges. Another problem would be the small caseload of the remaining states (472 in 1975), but
that is about the size of the First Circuit.
60. S. 2752, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The recommendation is contained in S. REP.
No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 15.
61.

COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 10. The Commission said that either plan

"would represent a significant improvement over the current situation." Id., 62 F.R.D. at
233.
62. S. 2752, supra note 60, § 1.
63. Id. The caseload of the Canal Zone is insignificant, having contributed only 17 cases
to the total load in 1975. A.O. ANN. REP. 332 (1975). The change was made because air travel is
easier to Miami than Houston. S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 9.
64. S. 2752, supra note 60, § I. The bill makes only one additional major substantive
change in the law. The existing provision of 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970), which makes a senior circuit
judge competent to "sit as a judge of the court en banc in the rehearing of a case or
controversy if he sat in the court or panel at the original hearing thereof," would be deleted to
return the law to its form prior to the 1963 amendment to § 46. Act of Nov. 13, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-176, 77 Stat. 331. That Act overruled the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685 (1960), that only active circuit judges could sit en
banc. 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) would also be amended to ease the problem of assigning judges
for service in the other division. In other circuits the Chief Justice must order the assignment,
but between divisions the chief judges would handle the assignment. S.2752, supranote 60, §
12. See COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 61.
65. S. 2752, supra note 60, § 5; S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 11-12, 17.
66. Hearings on S. 2988, at 87, 108-09 (Brown, Wisdom).
67. Only two ties would remain. First is the easier assignment provision discussed in note 59
supra. Second is the authority provided by an addition to 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1970) for the two
divisions to hold an annual joint judicial conference. S. 2752, supra note 60, § 20.
68. S. REP. NO. 94-513, supra note 34, at 27 (separate views).
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The justifications for dividing the Fifth Circuit under either plan are
numerous and convincing. The court recognized in 1971 that continual
increases in the number of judges would eventually create more problems
than the benefit of a slightly lessened caseload per judgeship. 69 A majority of
the judges assert that the experimentation forced upon them earlier by
increasing the court to fifteen judges has not worked well. 70 In 1964 Professor
Wright favored more judges as the least objectionable alternative to the Fifth
Circuit's problems. He argued that a split could always be made, that
experimentation would allow a view of the workings of a large appellate
court, and that "[i]f such a court is too unwieldy, if it shows inefficiency or
71
disunity," then the split could be made.
The problems encountered by the court are now clear and numerous. The
large number of judges has created intra-circuit conflicts, or the appearance
thereof, and disharmony to such an extent that instead of the one en banc case
the court heard in 1964, the court heard twenty-nine in 1974.72 The judges
expressed substantial dissatisfaction with the time required to confer with
73
fourteen other judges and the convention-like nature of en banc hearings.
Keeping track of the cases and the law of the circuit has become almost
unbearable. At one hearing, Judge Clark displayed the "slip" opinions of the
Fifth Circuit for one year: a stack measuring four feet two-and-one-half
inches high. 74 The attempt to keep up with the caseload now causes the judges
to question their ability to devote sufficient time for consideration of and
reflection on their cases. 75 The new procedures adopted by the court in an
effort to keep current, 76 in particular the denial of oral argument in about fifty
percent of its cases and the disposition of almost forty percent of its cases
without opinion, are further concerns. 77 Perhaps additional judges would
enable the divisions to reduce the use of these devices. Several judges have
also expressed the hope for a return to a more relaxed standard for oral
argument. 7 The net result of these years of experimentation in the Fifth
79
Circuit has been less deliberation, less explanation, and less visibility.
Circuit splitting may provide only temporary relief. But even Chief Judge
Brown finally admitted that if, as projections show, the Fifth Circuit should
69.

See note 49 supra and accompanying text.

70. See note 50 supra.
71. Wright, supra note 2, at 978.
72. Id. at 972; A.O. ANN. REP. 185 (1974).
73. Hearings on S. 2988, at I1; 1973 Commission Hearings 392 (joint statement).
74. 1973 Commission Hearings 403 (Clark); Hearingson S. 2988, at 149. Judge Godbold gave
the following example of the problems involved:
I have . . . called to my colleagues, to say, 'I have read your opinion . . . and
how about reading the following cases, which I think you will find is [sic] directly
contrary to what you have decided.' And in both instances, the judge wrote back
and said, 'You are right, I will have to withdraw the opinion.'
1973 Commission Hearings 379.
75. 1973 Commission Hearings 355 (Wisdom); cf. Wright, supra note 2, at 960-61.
76. See part III infra.
77. 1973 Commission Hearings 155 (Brown).
78. Hearings on S. 2988, at 150.
79. 1973 Commission Hearings 115 (Carrington).

1976]

NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS

have twenty-six judges by 1977,80 the court could not function at that size. 8
Thus, the only choice now before Congress is to increase the number of
judges dramatically or to split the circuit.8 2
Unfortunately, some remain unconvinced. In a statement of separate views on
the Judiciary Committee's report on S. 2752, five senators 3 argued that a split
was unnecessary. In part they contended that (1) the split would afford little
relief since the two new divisions would start with eleven and twelve judges
who would still have to keep abreast of a large number of cases decided by the
division, and (2) the en banc problem could be solved by having en banc
hearings limited to nine judges. 84 These arguments have a surface appeal, but
totally ignore the statistics and policies involved. If two divisions of eleven
and twelve judges are created, the caseload of each division would be, using
1974 figures and the Committee's recommended division, 1,742 cases in the
east and 1,552 cases in the west, or 145 cases per judge in the east and 141 in
the west. 8 5 Thus, each judge in an effort to maintain uniformity in circuit law
will have to consider only about one-half of the current number of decided
cases. More importantly, the judges would be relieved of a portion of the 219
cases each has been currently carrying. Admittedly both divisions might rise
quickly to fifteen judges and return to the problems that a large court with a
large caseload experiences. This situation is preferable, however, to a terribly
overburdened court, a backlog of cases, and the problems of administering a
court of thirty judges. The dissenters' proposed method of deciding cases en
banc 6 undoubtedly would lead to serious disharmony generated by those
judges who believe that their views are not represented in the en banc court
comprised of a minority of active judges.8 7
The dissenters' objection that two three-state circuits would be preferable
is on sounder ground. The dissenters note that S. 2752 violates three of the
Hruska Commission's standards: 8 (1) a two-state circuit is created, (2) both
divisions would begin with more than nine judges, and (3) greater diversity of
social and economic interests might be furthered by placing Mississippi with
Texas and Louisiana, a criterion that is more expansively stated as a loss of
federalizing influence.89 Undoubtedly, the proposed western division would
80.

Hearingson S. 2988, at 85 (administrative office projection).

81. Id. at 94. This remark was qualified by the desire for substantive reform of jurisdiction.
Cf. note 4 supra.
82.

Hearings on S. 2988, at 93-94 (Brown).

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Senators Hart, Kennedy, Bayh, Tunney, and Abourezk.
S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 28 (separate views).
Id. at 11-12.
They propose selecting nine judges on the basis of seniority. Id. at 28 (separate views).
This problem was articulated by Judge Haynsworth:
I dislike the notion of two classes of judges. . . and there are practical problems
in the proposal. It has been my experience that when all judges sit on divisive
issues the minority readily accepts the result because they feel that their views
have been fully heard and considered. This may not be true when some of the
active judges are not members of the en banc court, and I can foresee problems of
acceptance if a majority of a sharply divided en banc court did not represent the
view of a majority of the whole court.
1975 Commission Hearings 1081.
88.

S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 29-30 (separate views).

89. Id.
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constitute a two-state division, but one wonders whether this criterion
violation is important in a division containing Texas. Anyone who knows that
state cannot help agreeing with non-Texan Circuit Judge Charles Clark that
Texas is so diverse that it is one state only in the sense of being limited at the
moment to two United States Senators. 9 The second alleged violation,
however, is difficult to understand. When the Commission reported in 1973,
the caseload for two nine-judge divisions would have been 167 filings per
judge in the east and 163 in the west.91 By the time the Judiciary Committee
acted, however, the per-judge caseload for a nine-judge court had jumped to
178 in the west and 188 in the east, as opposed to a national average of 163.92
Thus, even though a split would admittedly accomplish only a small decrease
in the number of judges in each division compared to the present Fifth Circuit,
a substantial reduction in per-judge filings would be effected. Congress is
probably unwilling to reopen the whole question of nationwide circuit realignment and violently reject the principle of marginal interference to maintain
nine-judge courts. The only other readily available solution is further dividing
the Fifth Circuit into three two-state circuits, which could be labeled FifthEastern, -Middle, and -Western Divisions.9 3 This split would produce additional problems, the two most obvious being an unbalanced caseload between
the three divisions,94 and the creation of a circuit containing only Mississippi
and Alabama.
The final major objection is whether a two-state circuit can display the
appropriate federalizing influence. The initial focus is thus turned on TexasLouisiana.95 The Senate dissenters relied heavily on the testimony of Judge
Wisdom in the subcommittee hearings on the predecessor bill to S. 2752.96
Judge Wisdom argued against any split in the circuit on the ground that a
"court composed of judges from only Texas and Louisiana would [not] be
able to perform its federalizing function as well as the Fifth Circuit." 9 7
Proponents of the objection favor courts of appeals "composed of judges
90. Hearingson S. 2988, at 143-44. As a result of congressional actions in the area of energy,
many Texans have within the last three years begun seriously to discuss their alleged right to
divide into five states. SeeJoint Resolution of March I, 1845, in4 T.I.A.S. No. 113,689-90 (Miller
ed. 1934); 1973 Commission Hearings 410 (Flowers).
91. These figures assume Mississippi is placed in the west. COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL
BOUNDARIES 9, 67 F.R.D. at 233.
92. See S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 8-9, for 1974 figures.
93. The caseload, using 1974 figures, would be:
Eastern
Georgia
Florida
Canal Zone
Administrative
Cases

425
725
7
123
1,280

Middle
Alabama
Mississippi
Administrative
Cases

298
120
44
462

Western
Texas
Louisiana
Administrative
Cases

920
484
148
1,552

Administrative cases are proportioned on ratios established by other volume.
94. Although one division would require as many as eleven judges, another would have a
case load the size of the First Circuit which had 387 filings in 1974. A.O. ANN. REP. 363 (1974).
95. Just as Professor Wright did 12 years ago. Wright, supra note 2, at 976.
96. Hearings on S. 2988.
97. Id. at 96.
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who have practiced in different states, who have a wide variety of experience,
who are free from the prejudices and the provincialisms which color the
thinking of lawyers in any one state." 98 Admittedly a circuit with six states is
more federalized than a circuit with two, but one wonders whether the
difference is large enough to be significant. In many cases, a judge's judicial
philosophy, which is explored before the President nominates and the Senate
confirms that nomination, is more important than the state in which a judge
resides at the time of appointment. Other facts occasionally mentioned, such
as the effect of local education and idiosyncrasies of local practice, 99 lose
their force as law schools become nationally-oriented in teaching approaches
and local rules of procedure copy the Federal Rules.'°°
The critical issue with respect to circuit splitting is whether splitting the
circuit can be accomplished without creating a "Deep South" circuit... that
would not exhibit the appropriate federalizing influence or "a balanced
concern for national justice and equality."' 102 One consequence of the creation of such a court would be the expenditure of an inordinate amount of time
by the Supreme Court to insure that the circuit's decisions conform to those
of the Court. A subsidiary problem seems to be the fear that Mississippi will
escape control of more liberal members of the proposed western division.' 03
98. Wright, supra note 2, at 974. Professor Wright was referring to more than civil rights
cases.
99. Id.
100. The Senate dissenters' concern with the two-state circuit and its handling of civil rights
cases, apparently only a concern when the Fifth Circuit is discussed, makes little sense when the
specific situation is considered. No one would seriously contend that the judges of the proposed
western division have lacked federalization in any case. A further argument about less "common
law tradition" in the western division, see Wright, supra note 2, at 976, fails to note that the
common law, with exceptions, has been the law in Texas since the days of the Republic.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS art. IV, § 13: "The Congress shall, as early as
practicable, introduce, by statute, the common law of England, with such modifications as our
circumstances, in their judgment, may require; and in all criminal cases the common law shall be
the rule of decision." The common law was adopted by Act of Jan. 20, 1840, TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1 (1969). Spanish law influence, except in matrimonial property law, "is
currently rather insignificant." Baade, The Form of Marriage in Spanish North America, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1975). Texas lawyers must have been very surprised to find Texas labeled
a civil' law jurisdiction. See S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 8.
101. Critics of circuit splitting are primarily concerned that none of the more liberal judges
would be in the proposed eastern division. Even a casual Fifth Circuit watcher would not be
surprised at the suggestion that some western division judges are more liberal than Judge James
P. Coleman. Cf. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and Kings, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 673
(1973). For an analysis of blocs in the various courts of appeals see Goldman, Conflict on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 635 (1973), who
concludes: "The Fifth Circuit also demonstrated liberal and conservative blocs. The clearly
defined liberal bloc consists of . . . Wisdom, Tuttle, Brown, and Rives . . . , Goldberg,
Thornberry and Simpson. The conservatives identified [are]. . . Bell and Gewin,. .. Morgan,
Ainsworth, Dyer, Coleman and Godbold .... ."Id. at 650.
102. S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 31 (separate views). An additional point against
circuit splitting is that in energy-related cases judges from non-producing states lack the proper
perspective. Id. The argument is so speculative, however, that little weight can be given it. The
argument also ignores testimony that some of the states which could be placed in the proposed
eastern division are energy-producing states. See Hearings on S. 2988, at 144.
103. See note 100 supra. This concern was certainly real in 1964 when it was rumored that
Senator Eastland was determined to get Mississippi out of a circuit containing Judges Brown and
Wisdom who are regarded as liberals in civil rights cases. Christian Science Monitor, April 20,
1964, at 7, col. 3, quoted in Wright, supra note 2, at 955 n.18.
In 1975 the Mississippi federal appellate judges urged Congress to place the state in the eastern
division. Hearings on S. 2988, at 128-29, 143-45. Judge Clark said: "Mississippi has a historical
kinship with Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. It has a particularly close affinity with Alabama, its
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These fears have no rational basis today. There is no evidence that any judges
of the Fifth Circuit have failed to enforce the law in civil rights cases." ° But

enforcing the law as laid down by Congress or the Supreme Court is one thing;
leading the way into uncharted areas or applying expansive interpretations to
statutes or prior decisions is quite another. Second, the members of the court
from the proposed eastern division outnumber those from the western. Third,
one should remember that Mississippi has only two judges on the court.
Those three simple facts should allay concern about the circuit split and the

placement of Mississippi. However, additional analysis supports this conclusion. An examination of the performance of the Fifth Circuit in civil rights
cases presenting difficult issues sheds some light on the sensitivity of the

Fifth Circuit judges, their "concern for national justice and equality," and
their perceptions of the directions that the Supreme Court is taking. The cases
studied were the twelve civil rights en banc decisions rendered since January

1974.105 These cases present an opportunity to study the voting patterns of the
judges in complex and controversial cases raising for the most part close
questions on the cutting edge of the law. The survey shows that the more

conservative members of the court are in firm control of en banc decisions.
Nine of the twelve decisions were decided along more conservative lines than
those for which the dissenters argued." ° Although the make-up of this
conservative majority shifts, it can without too much disagreement be said to
consist of Judges Gewin, Coleman, Dyer, Roney, Gee, and Tjoflat.l0 7 The
moderates are Judges Brown, Thornberry, Ainsworth, Morgan, and Clark. 08
mirror-image twin, which not only is rooted in the past, but is also cemented into the foreseeable
future." Id. at 145. Although the Commission had recommended putting Mississippi in the
proposed western division, compare one of its reasons for not moving Arizona to the Tenth
Circuit: "We have also heard extensive testimony about the close economic, social and legal ties
between Southern California and Arizona . . . ." Id. at 15. See also COMMISSION, GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 9, 67 F.R.D. at 233. Since Mississippi is an energy-producing state, there may
also be an argument that a proper balance requires that it be separated from the big energy
producers of the proposed western division. See note 102 supra.
104. See Wright, supra note 2, at 955. As stated by Judge Friendly, identification of voting
blocs should not lead to a "conviction that judges regularly vote on ideological lines; it is only in
the closest cases that such attitudes may tip the balance." Friendly, supra note 101, at 677. See
also 1973 Commission Hearings 392,393 (joint statement): "We believe it is fair to say that the six
states which . . . comprise the Fifth Circuit are far more integrated on all levels than any other
six states in the nation. We have rendered more integration decisions than all of the other
Appellate Courts of the nation combined. A very high percentage of these decisions were
unanimous."
105. Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (first amendment); Bryan v.
Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (§ 1983, good faith defense); Golden v. Biscayne
Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (racial and religious discrimination);
Warner v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 528 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (§
1983); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (§ 1983); Ingraham
v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (cruel and unusual punishment); Willingham v.
Macon Telegraph Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (sex discrimination); Reese v.
Dallas County, 505 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd, 421 U.S. 477 (1975) (reapportionment); Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (due
process; right to hearing); United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(racial discrimination); Penn v. Schlesinger, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (racial
discrimination); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (racial discrimination).
106. The liberal judges tended to vote in favor of blacks and other minorities and against
employers and authorities generally. The conservatives were outvoted only in Reese, Mississippi,
and Morrow.
107. In the twelve cases these judges had the following conservative-liberal voting pattern:
Gewin (10-2); Coleman (12-0); Dyer (10-1); Roney (10-2); Gee (9-2); Tjoflat (5-0). Not all judges
participated in every case.
108. These judges had the following conservative-liberal voting pattern: Brown (4-8);
Thornberry (7-5); Ainsworth (8-4); Morgan (5-7); Clark (8-4).
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The liberals are clearly Judges Wisdom, Goldberg, and Godbold."°9
If the Fifth Circuit were restructured by passage of S. 2752, these judges
would be divided into two courts, with the eastern division composed of
conservatives Gewin, Coleman, Dyer, Roney, and Tjoflat, moderates Clark
and Morgan, and liberal Godbold. The western division would contain
conservative Gee, moderates Brown, Thornberry, and Ainsworth, and liberals Wisdom and Goldberg. If the en banc decisions of the Fifth Circuit had
been decided by the western judges alone, the result would have been
different in two cases' 10 and a tie would have resulted in another case.I" Thus,
the western judges, though not controlling the Fifth Circuit, could make a
significant change in the outcome of cases if left to their own circuit. On the
other hand, only one case would have been decided differently if decided by
the eastern judges alone." 12 Reese v. DallasCounty"13 presented the court with
a peculiar form of alleged discrimination in the interpretation of "fair and
effective" representation through "one man, one vote." The court was
presented with a county in which all four county commissioners were elected
in an at-large election, but a state statute required that a commissioner be
elected from each of four residency districts. The districts were dramatically
unequal in population, with almost half the voters residing in one of the four
districts. The plaintiffs contended that their votes were diluted to the extent
that they were forbidden to .elect commissioners resident in the city in
proportion to their numbers. The Fifth Circuit held, six judges dissenting, that
the plaintiffs had made out an unrebutted case of prima facie discrimination,
that the discrimination was odious, and remanded the case for fashioning
appropriate relief.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fifth Circuit had improperly
distinguished prior decisions which taught that in an at-large election "each
commissioner represents the citizens of the entire county and not merely those
of the district in which he resides." ' 1 4 Using that test, the Court concluded
that the plan without more assured each elector an equal vote for, if not equal
proximity to, the candidates. Thus, the one en banc case in which the
conservatives voted substantially together but still could not muster a majority" 5 was reversed by the Supreme Court. This is but one small indication,
109. These judges had the following conservative-liberal voting pattern: Wisdom (1-9);
Goldberg (0-12); Godbold (1-10). Judge James C. Hill, who joined the court on May 26, 1976, was
not included in the study because all of the cases were decided prior to that time.
110. Both cases, however, presented the same issues. Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528
F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Warner v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 528 F.2d
505 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc). Brown, Wisdom, Goldberg, and Thornberry dissented in both cases.
Ill. In Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), Brown,
Wisdom, and Goldberg dissented from a majority including Thornberry, Ainsworth, and Gee. A
fourth case, Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), probably would have
changed this result, but Judge Wisdom did not participate so his vote cannot be computed;
Brown, Goldberg, and Ainsworth dissented.
112. Reese v. Dallas County, 505 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd, 421 U.S. 477 (1975)
(per curiam) (8-0 decision). The dissenters would have become a majority of Coleman, Gewin,
Dyer, Clark and Roney. Simpson is not included because he had taken senior status. Those in the
majority would have become dissenters, Godbold and Morgan. Judge Tjoflat had not yet joined
the court. In Mississippi only Judges Coleman, Dyer, and Simpson dissented. In Morrow only
Judges Coleman and Gee dissented.
113. 505 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
114. 421 U.S. at 480.

115.

Another case of interest, although not heard en banc, is Johnson v. Mississippi, 488 F.2d
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along with the absence of reversal in other cases, that rather than creating a
"Deep South" circuit, the proposed eastern division would effectively carry
out Supreme Court mandates. Perhaps the question to be asked is whether the
proposed western division would need undue attention by the Court to
restrain those judges' enthusiasm for enforcing their "concern for national
justice and equality.""111 6 More importantly, this survey demonstrates that
control of the Fifth Circuit is now located in the proposed eastern division. If
fear of loss of control of Mississippi is the key to change, that loss has already
occurred.
The proposed circuit split would create three new judgeships in the east and
five in the west" 7 that may be located where Congress and the President
please. No matter where these judgeships or the Mississippi judges are
placed, a delay in the passage of S.2752 cannot be justified. The increasing
backlog of cases in the Fifth Circuit makes the time ripe for Congress to
provide relief. The placement of Mississippi is too minor a problem to hold up
the reform.
II.

THE STUDY GROUP AND THE HRUSKA COMMISSION:
A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS

Pursuant to the charge from Congress to study the "structure and internal
procedures" of the courts of appeals and to recommend appropriate
changes, "8 the Commission issued a second report eighteen months after the
initial report on geographic boundaries. The major recommendation was to
create a National Court of Appeals." 9 The tremendous influence on the
Commission's recommendation by the controversy surrounding the Study
Group's proposal for a slightly similar court makes an examination of that
controversy before moving to an evaluation of the Commission's proposal
helpful.
A.

The Study Group's Perception of the Problem

Charged with studying the caseload of the Supreme Court,' 20 the Study
Group determined that the Court was overworked.' 2' The figures used to
support this conclusion are persuasive. 22 The Group noted that the total
number of cases filed in the Court had zoomed from 1,178 in 1941 to 3,643 in
284, on petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, 491 F.2d 94(5th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S.
213 (1975). Rehearing en banc was refused over the dissents of Judges Brown, Wisdom,
Thornberry, Goldberg, and Ainsworth. The Supreme Court, affirming the panel decision, held
that § 245 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970), did not provide a basis for
removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(I) (1970) of charges filed in state court against
civil rights protestors.
116. S. REP. No. 94-513, supra note 34, at 31 (separate views).
117. S. 2752, supra note 60, § 5.
118. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, § I(b), 86 Stat. 807.
119. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE vii-viii, 67 F.R.D. at 199-200. Unfortunately, the Commission
chose the same name for its new court as that used by the Study Group.
120. Study Group ix.
121. Id. at 3-9. The Study Group characterized the Court as "now at the saturation point, if
not actually overwhelmed." Id. at 9.
122. But see Warren, The Proposed New "National Court of Appeals," 28 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 627 (1973), in which the late Chief Justice said that the Study Group's use of figures
was reminiscent of "McCarthy days." SeealsoTidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151,
174 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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1971, 123 a threefold increase while the number of Justices remained constant.
At the same time, the number of cases heard and decided remained fairly
steady, with a total of 143 cases decided by 129 opinions of the Court in the
1971 term against an average of 120 cases and 100 opinions for the fifteen
preceding years.'2 4 The enlarged caseload and the increasing complexity of
issues presented has made screening the cases for those deemed worthy of
review a time-consuming job. Thus, during the 1973 term only about six
percent of the paid cases were heard by the Court, as opposed to eighteen
percent in 1951.125 The Study Group concluded that these conditions were
"incompatible with the appropriate fulfillment of [the Court's] historic and

essential functions." 1

26

B.

The Proposed Solution

The time required to sift through the cases filed in the Court each year and
to pick those few accorded plenary disposition was perceived as a likely area

for reform. Thus, the Study Group proposed the creation of a National Court
of Appeals to be interposed in the existing federal hierarchy between the
existing courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. The National Court was to
supplant the Supreme Court as the locus of filing petitions for review now

filed with the Supreme Court. Denial of review by the National Court of
127
Appeals would be final, and no access to the Supreme Court would exist.

The remaining cases fall into two categories. Cases involving conflicts in
decisions between the regional courts of appeals would be certified to the
Supreme Court for decision if the case was otherwise of sufficient importance
for Supreme Court review.' 28 Other cases of conflict would be decided by the
National Court, and no access to the Supreme Court would exist. 29 The
123. Study Group 2-3. Admittedly, in forma pauperis cases made up a large part of the
increase. Only 178 such cases were filed in 1941, but in 1971 there were 1,930. Id. app., table 11,
at
A2.
124. Id. at 5. The 1973 term showed an explosion to 4,187 cases filed, but that term was
unusually long. Hruska, The NationalCourt of Appeals: An Analysis of Viewpoints, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 286, 289 n.8 (1975). This aberration makes the 3,661 cases filed in the 1974 term look
like leveling off is occurring, but the 3,939 cases filed in the 1975 term suggest that is unlikely. See
45 U.S.L.W. 3083 (July 27, 1976). The reasons for this general increase in caseload are unclear.
The Study Group noted the increase in population, expanding federal legislation, and changes in
constitutional doctrine. Study Group 3. A more recent study concludes that the Court itself, by
expanding rights and creating uncertainty, has been the major contributor to the docket
explosion. See Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court'sCaseload,3 J.LEGAL STUDIES
339, 360 (1974).
125. Griswold, RationingJustice-The Supreme Court'sCaseloadand What the Court Does
Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341 (1975). The importance of this gap is of course a matter of
dispute. Dean Griswold suggests that the gap shows a lack of appellate capacity, although it might
as easily show that the Court used to take cases that were not worthy of its attention. H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 51; 1974 Commission Hearings 213 (Friendly).
126. Study Group 5.Others have been less polite in their phrasing of the consequences of the
workload. Professor Kurland, speaking of the 1975 term, said that "[a]s a whole, this year's
opinions have not been those a law professor would find deserving of a good grade. I'd probably
flunk them all." TIME, July 12, 1976, at 37, col. I. Perhaps Professor Kurland is blessed with
better law students than the rest of us.
127. Study Group 21.
128. The Study Group was unclear as to what they intended for state court cases. Apparently
the National Court of Appeals could not decide cases of conflict between state courts and federal
circuit courts. See Stolz, FederalReview of State Court Decisionsof FederalQuestions: The Need
for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 944 n.6 (1976). For discussion of the
Hruska Commission's recommendation on this problem see part IV infra.
129. Study Group 21.
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remaining cases, estimated at four hundred, would be certified for possible
review. The Supreme Court could either grant or deny review, or in the case
of circuit conflict remand the case for decision by the National Court. 3 °
The composition of this new court was also detailed. Fearing a commitment
to the permanent establishment of a new court, 131 the Study Group proposed a
court consisting of seven circuit judges drawn from those in active service
and excluding chief judges- 2 and judges with less than five years' service.
The selection was to be by automatic rotation for three-year staggered terms
with no circuit represented by more than one judge.'
The Study Group conceded that "objections" could be raised to this plan.
The proposal was justified on the grounds that relief was imperative, subjectivity in the exercise of discretionary judgments concerning review was
limited, little loss of Supreme Court control of its functions would result, and
the nature of the appointments to the National Court of Appeals permitted
some experimentation without permanent commitment to a fourth tier of
courts. 134

C.

The Reaction

The proposal for a National Court of Appeals brought a firestorm of
The critics have been described as "numerous . . . , some of

objections.'

130. Id. at 22. In all cases the Supreme Court was to retain its power to grant review before
judgment of the circuit court, before denial of review by the National Court, or before judgment
there. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 24.
132. The proposal also excludes those "who would have succeeded to a Chief Judgeship
during their term of service on the National Court of Appeals had they been selected." Id. at 19.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 23-24. A number of other alternative approaches were explicitly considered but
rejected by the Group. Turning the Supreme Court into a constitutional court was rejected
because other important issues call for Supreme Court review. Constitutional issues are
frequently entwined with statutory ones, and counsel would tend, as might the Court, to inflate an
issue to a constitutional one. The Court would be deprived of broader issue experience. Id. at 10.
Excluding certain classes of cases was thought to hazard occasionally eliminating very important
issues. Id. at I1. Specialized courts offered no substantial impact on the number of cases reaching
the Court. Id. at 12. A criminal court was feared as giving the appearance of discriminatory
treatment. Id. Various screening devices were rejected as being incapable of uniform application
or giving no substantial relief to the individual Justices. Id. at 15. A National Court of Review
sitting in civil, administrative, and criminal divisions, each consisting of five judges who would
decide 150 cases a year, or 450 cases total, which would be reviewable by the Supreme Court, was
rejected reluctantly because of the more jolting nature of the proposal and the danger of
specialization. Id. at 17-18. Finally, the establishment of a national court to accept references
from the Supreme Court was rejected because the proposal afforded no work relief to the Court.
Id. at 16. Three other recommendations of the Group were much less controversial, and some
headway has been made on them. Elimination of three-judge district courts and direct review of
their decisions by the Supreme Court, elimination of direct appeals of ICC and certain antitrust
cases, and substituting certiorari for all appeals were recommended. Congress has revised the
ICC and antitrust appeal laws. See Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917 (1975) (codified in scattered
sections of 28, 49 U.S.C.) (ICC); Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 47, 49 U.S.C.) (antitrust). An act eliminating three-judge courts except "when
otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality
of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative
body" was signed into law on Aug. 12, 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). An
administrative procedure for screening prisoner complaints was also suggested, and improved
staff and secretarial facilities were though necessary. See Study Group 47-48.
135. The debate was centered in, but not reserved to, legal publications. The volume of
writing, most of it negative, quickly became quite staggering. See A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (Domestic Affairs Study No. 21, 1973); Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the
National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Black, The National Court ofAppeals:
An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of
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them important, some intemperate, some both, and some neither." 36 The
criticisms ranged widely, but the main ones may be briefly noted. Basically,
the National Court of Appeals was challenged as conflicting with the article
III requirement that there be only "one supreme court" ;137 by denying review
in some cases and determining in others whether review might be had in the
Supreme Court, the National Court of Appeals would be exercising part of the
Court's jurisdiction. 38 A second and equally serious argument was the

contention that deflecting most cases to the National Court of Appeals for
screening would deprive the Supreme Court of its ability to change the law
and would decrease the Court's awareness of the nature of the legal problems
confronting the country.' 39 Similarly, the finality of decision by the National

Court of Appeals would destroy the appearance of the universal availability
of the Supreme Court to resolve grievances of the populace. 40 Critics also
contended that screening was a minor part of the Court's load and relieving
that "burden" was not worth the costs. 4 ' Finally, members of the Court
142
denied publicly that the Court was overworked.
Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973);
Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1973); Burger

& Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund Study
Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973); Casper & Posner, supra note 124;
Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973); Freund, A
National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301 (1974); Gressman, The National Court of
Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Gressman, The Constitution v. The Freund Report,
41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (1973); Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10,
1973, at 14; Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 616 (1974); Lewin, Helping the Court with Its Work, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
March 3, 1973, at 15;Meredith, The Supreme Court of the United States and the Proposed
National Court of Appeals, 29 Mo. B.J. 441 (1973); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, A National Court of
Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 842 (1973); Stokes, National Court of Appeals:
An Alternative Proposal, 60 A. B.A.J. 179 (1974); Warren, Let's Not Weaken the Supreme Court,
60 A. B.A.J. 677 (1974); Warren, A Response to Recent Proposals to Dilute the Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 20 LOYOLA L. REV. 221 (1974); Warren, supra note 122; Symposium, Should the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court Be Changed? An Evaluation of the
Freund Report Proposals, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 878 (1974); Comment, The National Court of
Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 863 (1973);
Comment, The National Court of Appeals: Freund or Foe , 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 142 (1975); Note,
The National Court of Appeals: A Qualified Concurrence, 62 GEO. L.J. 881 (1974); Note, The
National Court of Appeals: A Constitutional "Inferior Court"?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 290 (1973).
136. A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 13.
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see, e.g., Gressman, The Constitution v. The Freund Report, 41
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (1973).
138. Gressman, supra note 137, at 958.
139. Black, supra note 135, at 888; Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: AnotherDissent,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1973); Gressman, supra note 137, at 959.
140. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 135, at 14, 16. But see A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 34,
quoting from E. HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES.
141. A raging debate developed on whether a case could be screened in 5 or 6 seconds, 5 or 6
minutes, or however long. A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 22, quoting Chief Justice Burger; H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 50-51.
142. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-77 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835, 836 (1973) ("the Supreme Court is not overworked").

One study not only concluded that the Court was not overworked to the extent of having its
essential functions impaired, but disputed the general contention that court congestion will get
worse as population and other activities increase. Casper & Posner, supra note 124. Although the
Study Group did not apparently rely heavily on the interviews in reaching its recommendation,
the Report stated that the members conferred privately with each member of the Court then
sitting. Study Group ix. Nothing in the Report suggests the views of the Court or the Justices
individually, but later developments tend to show that a majority of the Justices see the problem
as very serious. The Commission's second report contains letters or other comments from all
nine Justices on the Court in 1975. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE app. D, at 172-88, 67. F.R.D. at
394-409. At least five could fairly be characterized as in favor of some change.
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Critics also waged a collection of attacks on the structure of the proposed
National Court of Appeals. They alleged that the constant rotation of the
members of the court would prevent institutional stability; 43 the absence of
stimulating work would deter acceptance of the position by qualified
judges; 144 the possible lack of business would pressure the National Court of

Appeals to keep cases; 145 and cases denied review in the Supreme Court,
although possibly more important than those decided by the National Court of46
Appeals, would remain undecided unless a circuit conflict47 were involved.1
Supporters of the plan were in the end simply overrun.1
D.

Lessons Learned

Court reformers surely have learned from two years of heated debate the
obvious lesson that inertia is a powerful force. 48 Nevertheless, those in favor
of reform have continued their efforts, and the debate on the Study Group's
report has led to statements of guidelines to be followed in any future

proposals directed at court structural reform. Although stated in various
ways, a synthesized list of considerations imperatively to be taken into

account in any new plan includes:
(1) No automatic fourth level of review should be added to the federal
system.

(2) Specialization of courts and judges must be avoided.
(3) Criminal cases must, at least in appearance, be given treatment equal
to civil cases.
(4) If an intermediate additional level of review is added, a prestigious
court, comprised of permanent article III judges, appointed and

confirmed in a manner sensitive to political realities, and given
important tasks, must be constructed.
(5) Any new court should be so established as to maintain the prestige of
existing courts and judges.

(6) Any new court should operate free of jurisdictional disputes.
143. Warren & Burger, supra note 135, at 729 (Warren).
144. Alsup, supra note 135, at 1338.
145. Black, supra note 135, at 892.
146. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 49. The Study Group plan provided for Supreme
Court remand to the National Court of Appeals in cases of conflict in the courts of appeals with
directions to that court to decide the case if the Supreme Court wished not to decide it. Study
Group 22.
147. Not all the writing was critical. Defenders included the Study Group chairman, see
Freund articles cited supra note 135, and Professor Kurland, see Kurland, supra note 135. For the
neophyte the arguments pro and con are dispassionately reviewed by Professor Bickel, a member
of the Study Group, in A. BICKEL, supra note 135. Bickel sets out the following arguments: every
Justice except Justice Douglas admitted that the workload was heavy and the Court was working
at capacity, id. at 23, and that a serious problem either existed or soon would exist, id. at 28; it is
inconsistent to contend that screening petitions is a minimal part of the job but essential to the
functioning of the Court, id. at 32; the National Court of Appeals would see the signals for new
types of cases, id. at 33; access to the Supreme Court is now basically a symbol in light of the
minute percentage of cases decided there, id. at 34; history supports the finality of decision by the
National Court of Appeals as no usurpation of the Supreme Court's constitutional function, id. at
35-36; and the importance of the National Court of Appeals' functions would "sustain the new
court as an institution," id. at 37. If one tries to read the arguments independently of their
sources, a strong case is made for help for the Court. Judge Haynsworth is thus probably right
when he places the demise of the Study Group proposal in the hands of Justices Warren,
Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of CriminalCases in
the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 612-13 (1974).
148. Cf. Vanderbilt, Brief for a Better Court System, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1957, § 6
(Magazine), at 9: "Judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded."
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(7) Any new system should provide built-in flexibility to meet changing
conditions of federal dockets.
(8) Any proposal must not interfere with the Supreme Court's control
49
over its docket, choice of cases, or policing of lower federal courts. '
The final criterion, control of access to the Supreme Court, was in a view of
the Study Group the only viable solution to the problem seen as foremost:
overwork resulting from the sheer volume of cases. In light of the reaction of
present or former Justices of the Court to the suggestion that the Court was
"unable adequately to meet responsibilities,"' and their carefully phrased
denials that the workload was as unmanageable as represented by the Study
Group,' 5 ' an additional criterion should be added:
(9) The need for a National Court of Appeals must be justified on52a basis
other than the oppressive workload of the Supreme Court.1
E.

The Hruska Commission

The impact of these criteria was demonstrated when the Hruska Commission's chairman unveiled the basic outlines of its proposal at the National
Conference on Appellate Justice in January 1975.'51 The most important part
of the Commission's final report was the recommendation for the creation of
a new court called the National Court of Appeals. The new court was not
proposed to relieve the burden on the Supreme Court, but simply "to increase
the capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of issues
The court would be interposed in the federal court
.154
of national law ....
system between the Supreme Court and the existing courts of appeals. Seven
judges would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Their opinions would be binding on all lower federal courts and state courts on
questions of federal law. 55 The court's docket would consist of cases drawn
from two sources: "reference jurisdiction" cases referred to the court for
149. This list relies on the writings of Griswold, supra note 125, at 335-37; Hufstedler,
Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 547-48(1974); Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility
to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 587 (1974);
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 715-16.
150. Study Group 9.
151. See the articles by Warren, Goldberg, and Brennan cited in note 135 supra, and Douglas'
dissenting opinion in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-77 (1972). Justice
Douglas took the position that the Court disposed of "vast leisure time." Id. at 177. Justice
Brennan's descriptions were more constrained. His position was that the workload was "neither
intolerable nor impossible to handle." Brennan, supra note 142, at 837. For a personal, intimate,
and inside look by a clerk at the work and workload of the Justices and their law clerks see J.
WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE (1973).

See Griswold, supra note 125, at 338-39:
But I have slowly come to the conclusion that we have been looking at the wrong
problem. As long as influential members of the Court say that they are not
overworked . . . it is hard to develop a satisfactory cure for an illness the
existence of which is vigorously denied.
. . .[Tihe real problem is inadequate final appellate capacity ....
153. Address by Senator Hruska, National Conference on Appellate Justice, Jan. 26, 1975, in
San Diego, California.
154. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 5, 67 F.R.D. at 208; cf.Griswold, supra note 125, at 350-51. A
slightly different emphasis is placed on this historical progression in Alsup, supra note 14, at 433.
Mr. Alsup suggests that the command of the statute establishing the Commission prevented study
of the Supreme Court's caseload. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1,86 Stat. 807. Of
course that is technically true, but the entire thrust of the Commission's hearings and recommendations was to accommodate both sets of problems, and its final recommendation obviously has a
great effect on Supreme Court procedures.
155. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 30, 67 F.R.D. at 237.
152.
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resolution by the Supreme Court, and "transfer jurisdiction" cases transferred to the court by the regional courts of appeals. The reference cases would
be of two types: cases referred by the Supreme Court for consideration but
not necessarily plenary review, and cases designated by the Supreme Court
for decision. Appeals would have to be decided by either the Supreme Court
or the National Court of Appeals.' 56 State cases were specifically included
within the reference jurisdiction.' 57
The proposed "transfer jurisdiction" provoked the most controversy.' 5 8
This scheme would allow, subject to National Court of Appeals approval, the
transfer of jurisdiction from lower appellate courts'59 to the National Court in
cases that present an issue on which conflicting authority already exists and
need national resolution or that turn on doubtful application of a prior
National Court of Appeals decision. 60 In either type of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court would retain certiorari power to review any decision of the
National Court of Appeals.16'
The only similarity between this proposal and that of the Study Group was
the name and placement of the court. Practically every major objection to the
"old" National Court of Appeals proposal had been met: the need for the
court was based on the need to enlarge federal appellate court capacity;
complete access to the Supreme Court in all federal cases was preserved; no
automatic fourth-tier of review was added; no specialization would occur;
criminal cases were not singled out; prestigious permanent judgeships were
62
created; few legal issues regarding jurisdiction should arise.1
This recommendation must not be considered in isolation from the Commission's first report. Otherwise, the creation of a National Court of Appeals
that will do nothing to alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court or that of the
courts of appeals makes little sense. If one does not accept the Commission's
argument that a crying need exists for increased national resolution of federal
law issues to eliminate widespread uncertainty among judges and lawyers as
to what "the law" is,1 63 then numerous other proposals would more effectively cure whatever problem one perceives as themost pressing. Thus, if one
sees the basic problem as too much federal law creating too much federal
litigation which produces too many appeals and too many petitions for
certiorari, 164 the simple solution would be to cut back on available grounds of
156. Id. at 32, 67 F.R.D. at 239.
157. For a discussion of the issues raised by this proposal see part IV infra.
158. Witnesses before the Commission were almost unanimously critical of the transfer
jurisdiction. See 1975 Commission Hearings 1036, 1054, 1260, 1291, 1312, 1339 (Rubin, Stern,
Dixon, Butzner, Friendly, Morrison). But see id. at 824 (Doyle). Professor Levin suggested
recently that the transfer jurisdiction was not an "integral part of the Commission's proposal."
Levin, supra note 14, at 39.
159. The Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims, or the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 34, 67 F.R.D. at 241.
160. Id. at 35, 67 F.R.D. at 242. The National Court's caseload was estimated at 150 cases per
year decided on the merits. Id. at 39, 67 F.R.D. at 246. The genesis of the transfer and reference
jurisdiction may be traced to Carrington, supra note 2, at 614-15. Identical bills incorporating the
Commission's proposal for a National Court of Appeals were introduced in Congress and are
languislhing there. See S. 2762, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 11218, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975).
161. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 38, 67 F.R.D. at 246.
162. But see Owens, supra note 14, at 604-05.
163. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 125, at 341.
164.

See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
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federal jurisdiction or withdraw federal involvement in certain areas. 165
Others would suggest that the basic problem is too little staff assistance to the
judges." 6 If so, additional staff could be provided at less cost and certainly
greater appellate system efficiency than creating a new court.' 67 If one
perceives the problem as simply too great a burden for too few judges to
handle, both at the Supreme Court and courts of appeals level, then jurisdiction could be cut back, the courts of appeals could be given a certiorari-type
review, limitations could be placed on the right to file petitions with the
Supreme Court, more judges could be added to existing courts, or more
68
courts could be created.

The Commission presents persuasive evidence that the Supreme Court

even under the current structure increasingly fails to resolve existing inter69
circuit conflicts and that the need for additional appellate capacity exists. 1

Critics of the National Court of Appeals proposal concede that the study

reveals a system that is not working well. 7 0 Using the 1971 and 1972 terms of

the Court, a study done for the Commission concluded that between sixtyfive and seventy direct conflicts and about fifty strong partial conflicts were
presented to but not resolved by the Court.' 71 Decreasing that number by

eliminating constitutional cases, duplications, resolutions of issues, and cases
with serious procedural blocks to decision, the study projected thirty-two
direct conflicts and twenty-two to twenty-four strong partial conflicts in the

1972 term. 72 The impact that several new courts of appeals might have on this
problem must then be melded into the assessment of the recommendation.
What addition would have to be made to these figures if two new circuits were
created is difficult to estimate. Even a straight percentage increase to reflect
the increased number of circuits would add thirteen cases a year to the total of
direct conflicts and thus to the burden of the Court.
If the uncertainty and lack of predictability to settle questions of national

law are serious problems, and the problem of "jumboism"' 7 3 may be cured
only by circuit-splitting, then both problems and the ramifications of a cure

can be alleviated by the creation of the National Court of Appeals. One must
165. But see Leventhal, supra note 10, at 894: "We cannot halt the tide of federal law and
federal concerns."
166. D. MEADOR, supra note 31; 1975 Commission Hearings 1002 (Goodwin); Brown,
Statement on S.J. Res. 122, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), in Hearings on S. 2988, app. A, at 347,
362, 369-71.
167. 1975 Commission Hearings 953 (Carrington).
168. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 584 (1974).
169. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE app. B, 67 F.R.D. at 281.
170. Owens, supra note 14, at 598. But see Alsup, supra note 14, at 435:
The evidence relied upon by the Commission. . .shows that the problem, to the
extent that it exists at all, has been greatly exaggerated by the Commission.
Indeed, the problem is so small that in order to keep busy the new court would
have to decide not only cases presenting no conflicts at all, but also cases
presenting major constitutional issues.
Mr. Alsup asserted that the unresolved conflicts noted by the Commission are "either procedural
conflicts or minor substantive conflicts." Id. at 435-36. On the issue of certainty he correctly
notes that National Court of Appeals decisions are subject to Supreme Court review that may
come years later. Id. at 437.
171. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 17-18, 67 F.R.D. at 222-23.
172. Id. at 18, 67 F.R.D. at 223.
173. 1973 Commission Hearings 393 (joint statement).
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not lose sight of the integrated nature of the system with which we are dealing.

Considering either the first or second parts of the Commission's report in
isolation is a serious error. Standing alone, the case for a National Court of
Appeals may not be strong, but coupled with the present need for additional
circuits, the case becomes much more compelling. Under the Commission's
proposed reference and transfer jurisdiction to settle inconsistent resolutions
on issues of federal law, the National Court of Appeals could allay one of the
most persistent and persuasive arguments for not multiplying circuits. 71 4 The

National Court of Appeals can be a helpful and stabilizing influence. Any
additional burden added to the Supreme Court by having to make the
reference decision would 75be offset by relieving the Court of some of its
conflict-resolving duties.

1

As persuasive as these justifications for new appellate capacity may be,
one cannot escape the feeling that a B-I bomber is being called out to rid us of
a mosquito. Chief Justice Burger suggested this concern in his letter to the
Commission by reiterating alternate measures, such as repealing the three-

judge court acts 176 and eliminating diversity jurisdiction, as first steps before a
major overhaul of the federal court system is undertaken. 717 Others suggest
that the additional national appellate capacity would be so insignificant that
the immediate benefit would be unnoticeable. 178 One critic has even suggested
that the Commission has "unwittingly endorse[d] the notion of planned
obsolescence [by creating a] court, which by the Commission's own projections would soon be obsolete and which apparently could not be expanded or
179
converted into a structure appropriate for the needs of the future. '
174. As Professor Wright said in 1964:
If we choose to create additional circuits, rather than to name additional judges to
existing circuits, we will hold intra-circuit conflicts at their present level, but we
will increase inter-circuit conflicts. .
. Intra-circuit conflicts can be resolved,
where necessary, by an en banc hearing of all the judges of the circuit. Intercircuit conflicts can be resolved only by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Any action which will increase the burdens on that great Court must be highly
suspect.
Wright, supra note 2, at 973-74.
175. As several noted in reviewing the Commission's proposal, the Court now has in most
cases brought before it only to decide whether to grant review. 1975 Commission Hearings 929,
966, 1312, 1317 (Haworth, Carrington, Friendly, Goldberg). The existence of the National Court
of Appeals would introduce a second decision: whether, if review is denied, to refer the case to
the National Court of Appeals. One commentator has raised the practical problem of Justices
trying to refer cases to the National Court of Appeals to get a different result from that thought
likely in the Supreme Court. Owens, supra note 14, at 604. Of the two Justices who expressed an
opinion on the subject, neither thought the provision troubling. COMMISSION,STRUCTURE app. D,
at 180, 182, 67 F.R.D. at 400,402 (Stewart, White). The silence of other Justices supportive of the
general plan may also be indicative of lack of concern. What must be kept in mind is the
concomitant relief afforded the Court in releasing from its consideration numerous cases not
thought terribly important but which present conflicts on issues of federal law or cases involving
less important issues also needing resolution. Some examples are given by Dean Griswold at 1974
Commission Hearings 192-93. The real burden of that decision supposedly would fall on the law
clerks in their initial evaluation of the petitions for certiorari. See Kurland, supra note 135, at 627.
This slightly increased burden, however, would be outweighed by the lessened burden in conflict
cases. The transfer jurisdiction was generally not seen as burdensome to the Supreme Court but
was perceived as a burden to the courts of appeals. See, e.g., COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 182, 67
F.R.D. at 402 (White, J.). The main opposition to transfer jurisdiction in relation to the Supreme
Court was the possibly accelerated, and undesirable, adjudications to police the National Court
of Appeals. See 1975 Commission Hearings 1261 (Dixon).
176. See note 134 supra.
177. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE app. D, at 172, 67 F.R.D. at 397.
178. Alsup, supra note 14, at 442 n.42; Owens, supra note 14, at 603 n. 123; 1975 Commission
Hearings 1027 (Neal).
179. Owens, supra note 14, at 603.
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It is submitted that adoption of the Commission's proposals to split the

Fifth and Ninth Circuits and to create a National Court of Appeals would be
the first tentative steps toward creating a court structure that can cope with
the ever-increasing caseloads that seem inevitable. Rather than obsolescence, the plan contains the great virtue of any court reform: flexibility for the
future."8

The chronic understatement of the number of appeals in the past, coupled
with the projections for the future, favor the Commission's proposal. Total

appeals to the courts of appeals were projected in 1970 to be 13,801 for
1975,18 but the actual number was 16,658.182 Total appeals to the Fifth Circuit
were projected in 1970 to be 2,464 for 1975,183 but the actual number was
3,292.184 Shafroth's projection for 1981 is 38,875 appeals. 85 Thus, in simplest
terms twelve fifteen-judge circuits would each be faced with as many cases as
the Fifth Circuit now handles.186 The problem is not that simple, however,

because the caseload is unevenly distributed around the country. California
produces a large percentage of the Ninth Circuit's business, as does New

York for the Second Circuit.'87 New York already produces almost as many
filings as do all the states comprising the Third Circuit, which has nine
authorized judgeships. 188 In fact, the Southern District of New York alone

produced 801 filings, 189 enough for about two circuits the size of the First

Circuit."9 If a proliferation of circuits begins, there may soon be a court of
appeals for the southern tip of Manhattan Island.' 91 At the same time,
Congress and the bar will probably demand at least one appellate review with
the usual trappings of oral argument and an opinion to assure litigants that the
trial court's decision has been thoroughly considered. To accomplish this, the
number of judges will have to be increased tremendously, either within the
existing circuits or, more probably, coupled with the creation of new courts.
As the caseload, the circuits, and number of decisions grow, the conflicts,
180. See text accompanying note 149 supra. See also Rosenberg, supra note 168, at 588-89;
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 716.
181. NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 969 (5th Cir. 1970).
182. A.O. ANN. REP. 323 (1975). The relatively slight increase in the number of appeals
between 1974 and 1975, only 1.4%, had led to some optimism that the boom might be over. See
1974 Commission Hearings 162 (Goldberg); Hearings on S. 2988, at 9. Notwithstanding, the
Director of the Administrative Office, based on filings for the first half of 1976 (8,937), projected
total filings for 1976 at 18,700, an increase of 12.4%. See 1976 Semi-Annual Report of the
Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1-2.
183. NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966,969 (5th Cir. 1970).
184. A.O. ANN. REP. 325 (1975). Even with a 1971 upward revision of the estimate for the
Fifth Circuit to 3,188, see Hearings on S. 2988, at 364, the Shafroth projection was still short by
104 cases.
185. See Hearings on S. 2988, at 364. The Director of the Administrative Office projected in
his May 1976 report that appeals for 1976 would reach approximately the half-way mark on this
projection, forecasting 18,700 appeals for the year. 1976 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 182, at
I.
186. The Fifth Circuit for 1975 had 219 filings per authorized active judgeship. Brown, The
State of the Federal Judiciary in the Fifth Circuit, C.A. table 1(1976) [hereinafter cited as Brown,
Fifth Circuit].
187. In 1975 the federal district courts in California generated 1,362 appeals out of 2,731 for
the Ninth Circuit, and New York generated 1,265 of 1,739 for the Second Circuit. A.O. ANN. REP.
table B-3, at 330, 333 (1975) (administrative appeals not apportioned).
188. The Third Circuit had 1,392 filings in 1975. A.O. ANN. REP. 330 (1975).
189. Id. This figure does not include a proportionate number of administrative appeals.
190. The First Circuit had 477 filings in 1975. Id.
191. Hearings on S. 2988, at 96 (Wisdom).
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'sideswipes,"92 and other problems arising from a lack of capacity to resolve
national law issues will place such a burden on the National Court of Appeals
that it would either seek to sit in panels, or, more likely, seek the creation of
additional National Courts of Appeals.
The creation of an appellate division for the district courts within a limited
geographic area with discretionary appeal from that court to a larger regional
court, which is then policed by the Supreme Court, is a solution to the future
crisis.' 93 Our present regional circuit courts would become, in effect, that
appellate division; the National Court would be a regional reviewing court
with discretionary jurisdiction much like that which the Supreme Court now
has. In this way, coupled with restoration of oral argument and opinion
writing in the courts of appeals, 194 two of the original great virtues of the
Evarts Act that created the basic structure of our present courts of appeals,
control of the trial judges by the courts of appeals and a nationalizing
influence on the possibly parochial approaches to issues of federal concern of
those courts by the National Court of Appeals, 195 would be maintained.
If four tiers of review is troubling, so is the pervasive nature of federal law
and federal judges that could generate 38,875 appeals by 1981. The rapidly
disappearing art of advocacy in the federal intermediate courts is also
distressing. The courts of appeals are on the brink of fulfilling the prophecy
that summary dispositions would turn those courts into "virtually a branch of
the trial court rather than an intermediate tribunal for plenary review. 1 96 If
the courts of appeals are required to cut back on their use of summary
devices, as they should be, the creation of a National Court of Appeals is the
first step necessary to meet the challenge the future promises.
III. ORAL ARGUMENT AND OPINION WRITING
The courts of appeals are now widely using summary procedures in an
effort to keep current with the caseload. This use has generated substantial
controversy and produced major recommendations by the Commission in the
second part of its report dealing with internal procedures of the courts of
appeals. Those procedures, their effect, and the Commission's response to
them, although independently important, also lend persuasive support to the
argument for additional courts of appeals.
A.

The Move Toward Summary Procedures

Responding to a caseload crisis in the fall of 1968,1 97 the Fifth Circuit
instituted under the circuit's rule 18 a procedure for identifying cases "of
192.

A substantial divergence in approach to a common legal problem. COMMISSION, STRUC-

TURE 16, 67 F.R.D. at 221.

193. Haworth, supra note 2, at 321-25; Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping
the JudicialSystem, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901,910(1971); 1975 Commission Hearings 1039 (Rubin).
194. See part IV infra.
195. Carrington, supra note 2, at 612; Haworth, supra note 2, at 321; Wright, supra note 2, at
974-75.
196. Hazard, After the Trial Court-the Realities of Appellate Review, in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 60, 81 (H. Jones ed. 1965), quoted in Haworth, supra note 2, at
273.
197. The problem is vividly described by Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit in his
statement in S.J. Res. 122 Hearing, at 55:
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such character as not to justify oral argument." 198 Shortly thereafter, the
court added rule 21, which allowed for disposition of cases by the court with
the simple notation "Affirmed. [or Enforced.] See Local Rule 21."199 Practically every circuit has since adopted some method for curtailing the usual
full-blown appellate review of thirty minutes oral argument before a three-

judge panel and written opinion disposing of the appeal. 2" In other circuits,
where the press of business was not as great as in the Fifth, the usual
justifications for implementing these truncated procedures were the frivolous
or insubstantial nature of large numbers of appeals 2 1 and the poor quality of
20 2

oral argument.
20 3
The practice of writing opinions in all cases has long been under attack
and is recognized as a major consumer of judicial energies. 2° To save those
energies and unclutter the lawbooks,2 °5 courts tentatively at first but then in
growing numbers 2° 6 began to decide cases with no opinion, 2 7 a brief oral
opinion from the bench, 20 8 or a brief memorandum not for publication but for
the private enlightenment of the parties to the litigation. 2°9
B.

Critics Mount Counterattack

Many lawyers and some judges were not convinced by the justifications
advanced for these procedures, and criticisms of the reductions in oral
In the fall of 1968 with the prospect (later made good) of 1,489 filings that year, we
recognized that we could not possibly keep abreast of this inflow unless we found
some new ways. We knew that we could not get enough visiting Judges. For that
input . . . we would have required 64 court weeks. . . . [Tlhis would have
required . . 60 visiting Judges. We know [sic] we could not possibly obtain this
number, and our experience with the use of 45 (in 1966-67) proved that it was
impossible to effectively assimilate that many visiting Judges. This led us to adopt
the Fifth Circuit screening procedure.
198. 5TH CIR. R. 18. This process is described in Haworth, supra note 2, at 274-77. See also
Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 237 (1971); Note,
Screening of Criminal Cases in the Federal Courts ofAppeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 77 (1973). After reaching a high of 59.1% in 1972 of cases classified as I or II (no oral
argument), the 1975 figure fell to 51.2%. Brown, Fifth Circuit, supra note 186, C.A. table 2. The
Fifth Circuit should not be singled out. The Third Circuit is reported to be denying oral argument
in 50% of its cases. Segal, Oral Argument in the U.S. Court of Appeals: Can It Be Salvaged?, 2
LITIGATION 3 (1975).
199. 5TH CIR. R. 21; see Haworth, supra note 2, at 271-74.
200. By early 1973 every circuit save the Second had either a screening panel to limit or deny
oral argument in selected cases or a rule allowing disposition without written opinion. See
Haworth, supra note 2, at 265, 271. In October 1973 the Second Circuit in its local rules, 2D CIR.
R. § 0.23, recognized its practice of disposing of cases by oral decision in open court or by
summary order.
201. 1973 Commission Hearings 34 (Seitz, C.J. Third Circuit): "Sixty percent of all appeals
are easy or frivolous and do not require an opinion." See also 1975 Commission Hearings 683
(Bell): 30% of appeals "ought not to be there."
202. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 104, at 470 (2d ed. 1970); Segal, supra note 198, at 4.
203. The authorities are reviewed in Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the
Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791 (1975).
204. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 49, citing the Third Circuit Time Study showing that 48.2% of
case-related judge-time was devoted to the writing and clearing of opinions.
205. NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990,430 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1970).
206. For example, in 1971 in the Fifth Circuit, 210 appeals received a "Rule 21" no opinion,
488 cases in 1972, and 629 in 1973. See 1973 Commission Hearings 520 (Brown). In the Second
Circuit the number of dispositions from the bench jumped from 60 cases, or 14.1% of total cases
in 1966, to 284 cases, or 35.8% of total cases in 1973. 1973 Commission Hearings 1052 (Kaufman).
For the latest figures on this phenomenon see A.O. ANN. REP. 184 (1975), which shows 3,152
dispositions without opinions for 1975 in all the circuits.
207. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 21.
208. 1973 Commission Hearings 1032 (Kaufman).
209. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. § 0.23.
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argument and the disposition of cases with no written or oral statement by the

court began to mount.2"' The Commission, faced with this controversy,
authorized an in-depth study of attorney attitudes on various summary
devices. The results showed that the denial of oral argument and the lack of
formal opinions gained majority acceptance in many circumstances. 211 For

example, eighty-four percent of the Fifth Circuit attorneys agreed that denial
of oral argument was an acceptable practice, and fifty-one percent found

affirmance in a one-line judgment order acceptable, in the sense that cases
could be imagined that would deserve those treatments. 2 2 Enthusiasm for
these practices declined, however, when the same issue was presented in the
context of other than frivolous cases.2 13 Nearly all truncated procedures were
rejected by a majority of the lawyers when placed solely on the ground of
avoiding extreme delay.2 14 One is left to wonder what the reaction of the bar
would be to the fact that in 1973 in the Fifth Circuit 482 of 2008 cases received
2 15
no oral argument and a rule 21 disposition.
Oral Argument. One of the more disturbing parts of the Fifth Circuit's
screening procedures was the absence of an articulated standard to guide the
court and lawyers as to whether oral argument was appropriate in a particular
case. When pressed, the Fifth Circuit judges are hard put to do more than
assure the bar that they can "smell" an oral argument case216 or that
experience leads one to "feel" whether a case is one for oral argument. 21 7 The
standard set forth in Fifth Circuit local rule 18 that the "case is of such
2 18
character as not to justify oral argument" is simply no standard at all.
Another point of concern not actively expressed but clearly in the minds of
the judges was the extent to which law clerks have a say in the screening
process. Despite assurances that decisions to deny oral argument were
judge-made decisions, 219 hints began to appear that indicated that the clerks
210. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A. B.A.J.
1224 (1975); Goldschmid, Oral Argument, Summary Disposition, C.A.M.P.: The Second Circuit's Approach to Caseload Management, in 5 Appellate Justice: 1975, supra note 34, at 3;
Haworth, supra note 2, at 317-19; Segal, supra note 198; Wright, Oral Argument and the
Appellate Process, 2 LITIGATION 5 (1975); 1973 Commission Hearings 59-60,66 (Byrne, Marden);
1974 Commission Hearings 408-09 (Swygert); 1975 Commission Hearings 951-52, 993, 1337
(Carrington, Gibson, McGowan). But see Leventhal, Appellate Procedure: Design, Patchwork,
and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 432, 438-39 (1976).
211. See Drury, Attorney Attitudes, supra note 47, at 19.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 20. Acceptance by Fifth Circuit lawyers of denial of oral argument fell to 72% in
cases where the "issues are clear and can be decided by reference to precedent." Acceptance of
one-line affirmances fell to 44% in that type of case.
214. Id. Limitation of oral argument to 15-20 minutes per side retained general acceptance,
but only affirmance in a two-page memorandum otherwise retained majority support.
215. 1973 Commission Hearings 520 (Brown).
216. Id. at 416 (Gewin).
217. Id. (Morgan).
218. Accord, D.C. CIR. R. II(e). SeealsolsTCIR. R. 12 ("oral argument would notassistit");
9TH CIR. R. 3(a) ("oral argument would not be of assistance to the court"). There is substantial
doubt that courts have the power to promulgate these rules in light of the seemingly specific
provision in FED. R. App. P. 34(b). See Haworth, supra note 2, at 306-09; Wright, supra note 210,
at 6. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has construed rule 34(b) to establish only certain procedures
in the event oral argument is granted. NLRB v. Local 42, Heat & Frost Insulators, 476 F.2d 275
(3d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
219. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 89 (Brown). Indeed, Professor Carrington questions whether it
would violate the Constitution to delegate the decision to a non-judge. SeeCarrington, supra note
2, at 573.
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had more influence in the decision than was originally thought. The extent of
this influence is demonstrated by descriptions by the clerks of their functions, 2 0 detailed statements by the judges about their own internal procedures

in which the clerks were heavily engaged, 22' and by the Fifth Circuit staff
screening of cases within 222
selected subject matters and review of those
decisions by a single judge.

Another subject of concern has been the Fifth Circuit reversal rate which
dropped off dramatically after rules 18 and 21 were instituted. 223 The ready

response by three judges was that criminal appeals, many of which were
frivolous or easy, increased substantially during the same period of time, and
that accounted for the decline. 224 Indeed, the figures do show an increase in

the number of criminal appeals from 339 in 1968 to 652 in 1972,225 This
explanation has the problem that even after throwing out criminal cases and
refiguring the reversal rates for the years 1965-75, the last five gears were all
subject to rules 18 and 21 and show the lowest reversal rates among the
226
ten-year period.
Opinions. The attorney survey showed that up to seventy-two percent of
attorneys thought that due process should require a court to write at least a
brief statement of its reasons for decision. 227 The thought may be commendable, but no case supports that possible interpretation of the due process
clause. 228 Nevertheless, a large part of the Commission hearings was taken up
220.

Sweeney, In United States Court of Appeals, in Law Clerkships-Three Inside Views, 33

ALA. LAW. 155, 171, 176 (1972).

221. 1973 Commission Hearings 416-17 (Gewin, Coleman, Morgan, Clark).
222. 1975 Commission Hearings 870 (Brown).
223. Haworth, supra note 2, at 309-19. Administrative office figures show a drop in reversals
in the Fifth Circuit from 24.5% in 1965 to 16.0% in 1975. A.O. ANN. REP. 302 (1965); id. at 325
(1975). Comparing rates back to 1945, the reversal rates for 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975 are
the lowest in the history of the circuit.
224. 1973 Commission Hearings 147-48, 358, 453 (Brown, Wisdom, Bell).
225. Id. at 515 (Brown).
226. But see Carrington, A Statistical Analysis of the Workload of the United States Courts of
Appeals, in I Appellate Justice: 1975, supra note 34, at 45, in which Professor Carrington, after
comparing figures for 1962-64 and 1970-72, concludes that "the reversal rate has maintained a
fairly steady overall relationship to dispositions .... ." Even taking the Fifth Circuit's own
figures for 1973, which differ from those of the Administrative Office, the reversal rate is figured
to be 10.7% for criminal, prisoner, and § 2255 appeals, but only 19.0% for all civil appeals. 1973
Commission Hearings 518 (Brown). Although the figures are not absolutely comparable, the
Administrative Office shows this to be the lowest reversal rate since at least 1945. The Fifth
Circuit's own computations show the following:
Fiscal Year
No. of Cases Judged
% Reversed
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

828
716
886
970
1089
1279
1427
1812
2025
2167

29.5
25.1
24.7
25.3
25.5
24.8
24.1
19.5
14.9
15.6

1973 Commission Hearings 536 (Brown).
227. Drury, Attorney Attitudes, supra note 47, at 43.
228.

See 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 16.13, at 488 (1958); Radin, The Requirement of

Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 486(1930). The court in Ayres v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 48,
79 (1908), which Davis cites for the contrary proposition, merely affirmed its right to publish an
opinion.
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by the problem of opinion-writing. 229 This is also an area showing promise for
time-saving since the Third Circuit time study showed that about forty-eight
20
percent of case time was devoted to that enterprise.
In each case a court must decide whether an opinion of any sort is to be
prepared, and whether an opinion, if prepared, is to be published. Five
circuits now provide for affirmances without opinion."' This device has come
under increased attack, with the consensus being that some statement of
reasons for the decision, however informal and brief, written or oral, should
be the due of every litigant as a matter of policy. 23 2 The potential for abuse and
the lack of visibility of the courts' actions weigh heavily against approval of
the one-line disposition.
Several circuits that issue a brief written memorandum order do not publish
these orders.233 The experience with unpublished opinions has not been a
particularly happy one according to some commentators. The California state
courts have recently come under direct and sustained attack for not publish234
ing opinions setting out new points of law or applying old law to new facts.
After reviewing the workings of the non-publication rule in that state, one
commentator concluded that instead of reducing only the volume of reiterations of settled law, the non-published opinions contained numerous valuable
precedents. 235 Reviewing several cases from the Ninth Circuit, another
commentator 23 6 concluded that those cases contained numerous "inconsis-

tent decisions. ",237
Several years earlier, when unpublished memorandum decisions first
became popular, the warning was sounded as to their potential abuse. 238 The
difficulty of assaying results in dispositions without decisions prevents
evaluating the extent of abuses, but the conclusions regarding the work of the
California courts are consistent with the perceived virtues of judges having to
write opinions that will be published; the publication of decisions promotes
careful study of the case. 239 Is anyone really surprised if the absence of those
disciplines has not produced quality results?
Unpublished memorandum decisions also raise the issue of whether unpublished opinions can be cited to a court. The arguments on both sides of the
issue are powerful. Proponents of non-citation often make the following
229. 1974 Commission Hearings 519 (Sprecher); 1975 Commission Hearings 735, 1056-57,
1239-40 (Sandalow, Stern, Pollak).
230.

Third Circuit Judicial Time Study, 1974 Commission Hearings 525.

231. SeeD.C. CIR. R. 13(c); IsT CIR. R. 14; 5TH CIR. R. 21; 8TH CIR. R. 14;10TH CIR. R. 17.
232. See authorities cited at note 229 supra. The attorney survey showed that 62% of Second
Circuit lawyers, 70% of Fifth Circuit lawyers, and 72% of Sixth Circuit lawyers thought that "the
due process clause of the Constitution should be held to require courts of appeals to write at least
a brief statement of the reasons for their decisions." Drury, Attorney Attitudes, supra note 47, at
143.

233. 1974 Commission Hearings 519-20 (Sprecher).
234. Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CALIF. ST. B.J. 387
(1973); Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37
(1972); Comment, Publish or Perish: The Destiny of Appellate Opinions in California, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 756 (1973).

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Kanner, supra note 234, at 442-43.
Gardner, supra note 210.
Id. at 1227.
Haworth, supra note 2, at 272-73.
1975 Commission Hearings 735,802,951, 1239-40 (Sandalow, Field, Carrington, Pollak).
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arguments: citation will lead to a "black market" in unpublished opinions,
leading publishers to seize upon an untapped resource of "unpublished"
opinions, thereby defeating one goal of the program; access to unpublished
opinions may be unequal, especially between governmental agencies and
private litigants; citation would inevitably lead to greater pains being taken in
preparation of the order; and it is impossible to tell whether the decision has
been overruled. On the other hand, opponents argue that prohibiting a litigant
from citing any previous decision of a court is not only unfair, but also
240
contrary to the rule of stare decisis.
The "no-citation" forces have won the first round. All courts of appeals,
save one, dealing with the problem either by rule or opinion favor noncitation. 2 4' In a perfect world this solution seems best because no precedential
240. See ACAJ, Standards for Publication of JudicialOpinions, in 2 Appellate Justice: 1975,
supra note 34, at 86-87; ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.37 (1976).
241. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 8(f); IST CIR. R. app. B; 2DCIR. R. §0.23;4THCIR. R. 18;Jonesv.
Superintendent, Va. St. Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972); 6TH CIR. R. 11; 7TH CIR. R. 35;
9TH CIR. R. 21; 10TH CIR. R. 17. The Tenth Circuit allows citation in limited circumstances. See
note 261 infra and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit's new rule 35, supra, presents a
comprehensive model:
The following rule is the Plan for Publication of Opinions of the Seventh Circuit
promulgated pursuant to resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United
States:
(a) Policy. It is the policy of this circuit to reduce the proliferation of published
opinions.
(b) Publication. The court may dispose of an appeal by an order or by an opinion,
which may be signed or per curiam. Orders shall not be published and opinions
shall be published.
(1) "Published" or "publication" means:
(i) Printing the opinoin as a slip opinion;
(ii) Distributing the printed slip opinion to all federal judges within the
circuit, legal publishing companies, libraries and other regular subscribers,
interested United States attorneys, departments and agencies, and the news
media;
(iii) Permitting publication by legal publishing companies as they see fit; and
(iv) Unlimited citation as precedent.
(2) Unpublished orders:
(i) Shall be typewritten and reproduced by copying machine;
(ii) Shall be distributed only to the circuit judges, counsel for the parties in
the case, the lower court judge or agency in the case, and the news media, and
shall be available to the public on the same basis as any other pleading in the case;
(iii) Shall be available for listing periodically in the Federal Reporter showing only title, docket number, date, district or agency appealed from with citation
of prior opinion (if reported) and the judgment or operative words of the order,
such as "affirmed," "enforced," "reversed," "reversed and remanded," and so
forth;
(iv) Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of
the case, shall not be cited or used as precedent (a) in any federal court within the
circuit in any written document or in oral argument or (b) by any such court for
any purpose.
(c) Guidelines for Method of Disposition.
(1) Published opinions:
Shall be filed in signed or per curiam form in appeals which
(i) Establish a new or change an existing rule of law;
(ii) Involve an issue of continuing public interest;
(iii) Criticize or question existing law;
(iv) Constitute a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal
literature
(A) by a historical review of law;
(B) by describing legislative history; or
(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law; or
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value attaches to an opinion that says nothing new. In other words, by
definition ample precedent in addition to the unpublished opinion should be
available to support the rule for which a party contends, otherwise the order

would have been published. Of course, the difficulty is that apparently some
of these decisions do have precedential value.
C.

Proposed Solutions

Clearly reform was needed in the areas of both oral argument and opinionwriting. The ideal solution would of course be that only non-frivolous appeals
be taken and disposed of after oral argument with a written opinion. Absent
that, and recognizing that frivolous appeals would continue to be taken to the
appellate courts, the Commission's task was to strike a balance that gave
flexibility but provided guidelines.
Solutions for Oral Argument. The Commission delivered a ringing endorse-

ment of face-to-face confrontation with the court. 24 2 To remedy the situation
that had developed, especially in the Fifth Circuit, the Commission proposed

adding the following rule to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure:
I. In any appeal in a civil or criminal case, the appellant should be
entitled as a matter of right to present oral argument, unless:
(v) Reverse a judgment or deny enforcement of an order when the lower
court or agency has published an opinion supporting the order.
(2) Unpublished orders:
(i) May be filed after an oral statement of reasons has been given from the
bench and may include only, or little more than, the judgment rendered in appeals
which
(A) are frivolous or
(B) present no question sufficiently substantial to require explanation
of the reasons for the action taken, such as where
(aa) a controlling statute or decision determines the appeal;
(bb) issues are factual only and judgment appealed from is supported by evidence;
(cc) order appealed from is nonappealable or this court lacks jurisdiction or appellant lacks standing to sue; or
(ii) May contain reasons for the judgment but ordinarily not a complete nor
necessarily any statement of the facts, in appeals which
(A) are not frivolous but
(B) present arguments concerning the application of recognized rules
of law, which are sufficiently substantial to warrant explanation but are not of
general interest or importance.
(d) Disposition is to be by Order or Opinion.
(I) The determination to dispose of an appeal by unpublished opinion shall be
made by a majority of the panel rendering the decision,
(2) The requirement of a majority represents the policy of this circuit. Notwithstanding the right of a single federal judge to make an opinion available for
publication, it is expected that a single judge will ordinarily respect and abide by
the opinion of the majority in determining whether to publish.
(3) Any person may request by motion that a decision by unpublished order be
issued as a published opinion. The request should state the reasons why the
publication would be consistent with the guidelines for disposition of appeals as
set forth in this rule.
But see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 35-39 (1976), where

the authors call for an end to non-publication and non-citation rules.
242. The Commission said:
Oral argument is an essential part of the appellate process. It contributes to
judicial accountability, it guards against undue reliance on staff work, and it
promotes understanding in ways that cannot be matched by written communication. It assures the litigant that his case has been given consideration by those
charged with deciding it. The hearing of argument takes a small proportion of any
appellate court's time; the saving of time to be achieved by discouraging argument is too small to justify routinely dispensing with oral argument.
COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 48.
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(a) the appeal is frivolous;

(b) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been decided; or
(c) the facts are simple, the determination of the appeal rests on the
application of settled rules of law, and no useful purpose could be
served by oral argument.

2. Oral argument is appropriately shortened in cases in which the

dispositive points can be adequately presented in less than the usual

time allowable .243

One can hardly quarrel with this test. The Second Circuit is not affected since
that circuit hears oral argument in every case, but the Fifth Circuit will only be
allowed to refuse oral argument in the type of cases for which screening was
originally designed: the thirty percent of the docket that contains little or no
merit. 244 Flexibility still remains, and judges will still be able to fit cases within
a no-argument category when appropriate. Certainly much is left to their

discretion, but judges must be trusted to apply the stated standard honestly.
Few persons today expect the courts to afford oral argument in every appeal,
but a substantial decrease in the percentage of dispositions without oral
245
argument should result from the promulgation of this standard.
The promulgation of this standard that is more strict than that currently in

use by the courts, particularly the Fifth Circuit, presents a significant
problem. For the first time in its history of struggling against the flood of
cases, the Fifth Circuit is approaching inundation. Reviewing the state of the
Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Brown noted that the actual backlog as of the end of
April 1976 was 359 cases, with a total of 519 estimated for the year. 246 The
future looks even grimmer. Assuming that full screening remains in effect,
Judge Brown estimates that by 1983 the Fifth Circuit will be hearing oral

argument annually in 562 fewer cases than are ready for hearing, and of the
780 cases that can be heard, 631 will be preference cases. 247 Since the
243. Id. See ACAJ, Report and Recommendations on Improvements of Appellate Practices,in
5 Appellate Justice: 1975, supra note 34, at 127.
244. 1973 Commission Hearings 452 (Bell).
245. One problem with this standard is reviewability of a determination that oral argument is
not warranted. One can envision petitions for writs of mandamus being filed with the Supreme
Court seeking an order directing the circuit court to hear oral argument in a particular case. The
stated test seems to leave enough discretion in the circuit court to evade such review. But see P.
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 241, at 18. They contend that oral
argument ought to be heard in every case in which either party requests it.
246. Brown, Fifth Circuit, supra note 186, at 21.
247. Judge Brown's projections are:
PROJECTION OF NUMBER OF NON-PREFERENCE CASES WHICH
CAN BE CALENDARED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT-1976-1983

(a)

F.Y.

(b)

Maximum Cases
Which Can Be
Cases for Hear- Orally Argued
ing Calendar* (41 Court Weeks)

(c)

(d)

Preference
Cases**

Slots Remaining
for Non-Preference
Cases

1976
915
780
1977
970
780
1978
1028
780
1979
1090
780
1980
1155
780
1981
1192
780
1982
1263
780
1983
1342
780
*Based on Projection for 1976, plus 6% Annual
**47% of Cases for Calendaring.
Brown, Fifth Circuit, supra note 186, C.A. table 6(a).

430
456
483
512
542
560
594
631
Increase.

349
323
296
267
237
219
185
148
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preference cases will fill the docket, Judge Brown also estimates that the
caseload will be so enormous by 1979 that it will take until 1987 to hear all the
new non-preference cases that were ready for argument in 1979, a possible
delay of eight years. 24 8 What must be done to bring these projections into
The following categories of cases, pursuant to specific Acts of Congress, and
the rules of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, receive priority in calendaring and
decision in the order set forth:
1) Criminal Appeals (Rule 45(b), FRAP).
2) Appeals from orders refusing or imposing conditions of release.
3) Protracted, difficult or widely 5ublicized cases in conformity with resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States of October 29, 1971.
4) Habeas Corpus and Section 2255 (28 U.S.C.) Appeals.
5) Organized Crime Control Act.
6) Selective Service Criminal Cases.
7) Mandamus, prohibition and extraordinary writs.
8) Expedited Civil Appeals.
9) Interlocutory Appeals.
10) National Labor Relations Act.
II) Social Security Appeals.
12) Immigration & Naturalization Appeals.
13) Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.
14) Norris-LaGuardia Act.
15) Administrative Orders, Review Act of 1966.
16) Clayton Antitrust Act; Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act.
17) Federal Trade Commission Act.
18) Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
19) Fair Housing Act of 1968.
20) Small Business Investment Act of 1958.
21) Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.
22) Federal Seed Act.
23) Fifth Circuit cases which have been remanded by the Supreme Court for
further consideration or proceedings, Labor Board contempt or supplemental
enforcement proceedings and second appeals involving the same parties or issues
taken after reversal of a former appeal.
Id., app.
248. The following projections show how preference cases can eventually exclude nonpreference cases from court action:
PROJECTION OF DATES OF HEARING OF
NON-PREFERENCE CASES-F.Y. 1975-1979
(a)
(b)
(c)
Year and Percent
Maximum
Non-Preference
Non-Preference Cases
Non-Preference Cases*
Case Will Be Heard
Which Can Be Heard**
Backlog of Non-Preference Year
Cases from
F.Y.1975
330
1976

%
100.0

330

3.9
66.6
29.5

19
323
142

100.0

485

0.0
29.8
51.9
18.3

0
153
267
94

100.0

514

New Non-Preference Cases
To Be Readied:
F.Y. 1976

485

1976
1977
1978

F.Y. 1977

514

1977
1978
1979
1980

349

323
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sharper focus is to increase the number of cases ready for oral argument by
decreasing the number disposed of by screening. Estimating that thirty
percent of the total cases will be classified as Summary II (no oral argument),
then some 600 more cases must be calendared for oral argument the first year
alone. This load would require about fifteen weeks of sitting per year per
active judge. While that load is not impossible, one must remember that
judges need time to write opinions.
The problems that arise from the oral argument standard lead to the
conclusion that splitting the Fifth Circuit is about the only practical alternative to a court of gargantuan size. The two new courts would each have
approximately the same number of judges as the existing Fifth; this growth of
the judiciary is necessitated by the additional pressure of a nationwide
standard for oral argument. The benefit, which is worth the cost, is that oral
argument in every meritorious case will be heard.249
Solutions for Opinion Writing. Taking a more flexible approach to the
question of opinion writing, the Commission recommended that the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure be amended to require that some record of the
grounds for decision, however brief, be provided the litigants in every case
although the decision need not be published.2 5° The Commission also urged
0.0
0.0
26.2
40.2
33.6

0
0
143
219
183

100.0

545

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
25.6
Bal.

0
0
0
0
148
430

296

F.Y. 1978

545

1978
199
1980
1981
1982

F.Y. 1979

578

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984-87

F.Y. 1980

613

237

F.Y. 1981
F.Y. 1982

650
689

219
185

730
F.Y. 1983
*Columns (a) less column (c) of Table 1.
**See Column (d) on Table 1.

267

148

Id. C.A. table 6(b).
249. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit sees the writing on the wall, for it has recently amended its local
rules to provide:
Request for Oral Argument-If counsel for appellant desires oral argument,
counsel shall include in appellant's brief (as a preamble thereto), a short statement of the reasons why oral argument would be helpful. Appellee shall likewise
include in his brief a statement of why oral argument should or need not be had.
The Court will accord these statements due weight, though not controlling, in
determining whether oral argument will be heard in the case.
5TH CR. R. 13(j)(2). This is the first recognition of the problem generated by that court, and is a
step forward in its attempt to mollify members of the bar.
250. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 50, 67 F.R.D. at 397. One problem may be how to enact this
requirement. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), the Supreme Court might promulgate a rule
reflecting the proposal discussed in the text, report the amended rule to Congress, and wait 90
days for the rule to become effective. If the rule were then an Act of Congress, a serious question
as to its constitutionality would be raised under the separation of powers doctrine. See 1975
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the use of alternatives to the signed opinion, including memorandum and per
curiam opinions. 251 If adopted, these procedures will not really weigh heavily
on any court, including the Fifth Circuit where the reported number of rule 21
opinions reached 633 cases or 34.9 percent of the docket in 1974.252 Some
judges are now adding a case or a sentence to the bare notation. 213 Nevertheless, a reasoned disposition, however brief, will add to the burden on the
courts. It is fairly clear that the tremendous increase in productivity achieved
by the Fifth Circuit from 1968 to 1972 was in large part the result of the local
rule 21 procedure.25 4 Thus, any cut-back in the summary manner of disposition exemplified by a rule 21-type procedure will increase the power of the
arguments for more circuit judges and the creation of additional circuits.
The Commission's approval of non-published opinions is unlikely to halt
the debate on the appropriateness of that practice. The problem in the Ninth
Circuit, which does not publish informal dispositions, was perceived by one
commentator as so bad that he proposed a procedure that would allow any
member of the bar in the Ninth Circuit to demand publication of an opinion
otherwise designated for non-publication. 255 That solution seems unworkable
in a system designed to help ease the burden of preparing opinions that are not
to be published. One of the chief benefits derived from non-publication is the
25 6
absence of the refined draftsmanship that is needed for a published opinion.
The unpublished opinion was adopted as a device which would cure the evils,
or supposed evils, of the Fifth Circuit practice of affirming with no opinion.
The no-opinion practice made it virtually impossible to determine whether
rule 21 decisions were producing inconsistent results within the circuit. Such
a determination would require incredible research facilities and personnel to
reconsider the briefs and records in every case to dig out the inconsistencies.
No one has tried, and probably no one will. The non-published opinion
procedure allows attorneys to evaluate court determinations, yet retains the
time-saving benefit of the no-opinion procedure. A review of the inconsistencies demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's unpublished opinions 25 7 suggests the
danger that is inherent in the Fifth Circuit's no-opinion procedure.
The non-published opinion procedure has tremendous potential for saving
time and ridding advance sheets of worthless cases. If the judges are unable or
unwilling to police themselves, however, a return to the publication of every
opinion may be the course to follow. The Ninth Circuit has taken a small step
in the right direction by authorizing requests for publication to be made to the
Commission Hearings 683-84 (Bell); cf. Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4 S.W. 751 (1887);
Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859); State ex rel. La France Copper Co. v. District Court, 40
Mont. 206, 105 P. 721 (1909); Degnan, The Law of FederalEvidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV.
275, 288-89 (1962).
251. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 51, 67 F.R.D. at 258.
252. 1975 Commission Hearings 892 (Brown). For 1975 the rate was running at 38.6%. Id.
253. Judge Griffin Bell stated his adjusted practice:
I might say, since June 1 [1973], 1 have not written a Rule 21 opinion. I started
trying out the idea of saying Affirm, See Local Rule 21, and then write something,
and I find that is an easy thing to do. I can write a paragraph, sometimes a
sentence, see such and such a case, soit is not a burden at all on a judge to do this.
1975 Commission Hearings 683.
254. See Haworth, supra note 2, at 288.
255. Gardner, supra note 210, at 1227.
256.

COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 50, 67 F.R.D. at 257.

257.

Gardner, supra note 210.
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clerk; 258 those few individuals with access to unpublished opinions can
request that decision to be published if an important or inconsistent decision
is spotted.
Before more drastic steps have to be taken, judges should take a different
approach to the non-publication of opinions. At present, the presumption is
against publishing unless the case clearly falls within generally accepted
categories of publishability. 5 9 The emphasis should be in the other direction:
every decision should be published unless all panel members agree that
nothing new has been added to the body of law. To err on the side of
publishing does little harm; to err the other way leaves a court open to the
kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at the California state and federal
courts. These criticisms could eventually lead to the loss of an important
judicial tool in the fight against the ever-increasing flood of litigation.
The Commission was wise not to enter the debate regarding whether
unpublished opinions may be cited to the court. Most courts of appeals that
have taken a position on this issue deny counsel the right to cite unpublished
opinions to the court except for res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the
case purposes ;260 the Tenth Circuit allows citation if counsel furnishes a copy
of the opinion to opposing counsel.2 61 At first glance this approach will not
work well since counsel undoubtedly will cite favorable cases and let unfavorable ones remain buried and hidden from view. Nevertheless, the experimentation should be interesting to monitor, and the Commission properly refused
to recommend a rigid approach to a problem with which the courts have not
yet had sufficient experience.
The courts of appeals have commendably introduced new and innovative
procedures into the traditional method of appellate process. They may have
overreacted, however, to the increasing backlog of cases. Some time-saving
devices may still be utilized in the appropriate circumstances, but procedures
designed to accomplish a fair disposition of cases must eventually lead to the
need for more courts and judges to help avoid scandalous backlogs.
IV.

REVIEW OF STATE COURT DECISIONS

Early in our history the question arose whether the Supreme Court had
appellate jurisdiction over cases that were within the judicial power of the
63
2 62
United States but decided in state courts. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
Justice Story held that jurisdiction did extend to those cases. That decision
does not cause significant controversy today,2' 6 but buried away in the
258.

9TH CIR. R. 21(g).

259. See, e.g., IST CIR. R. app. B(a) ("a presumption, in the absence of justification, against
publication").
260. See D.C. CIR. R. 8(f); 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv).
261. See note 241 supra. 10TH CIR. R. 17(c) provides in part that: "Unpublished opinions...
can nevertheless be cited, if relevant, in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel
citing same shall serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing counsel." The recently
promulgated 4TH CIR. R. 18 provides for generally the same procedure.

262. An elementary proposition regarding the division of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts is that state courts generally have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions of
and cases arising under federal law. C. WRIGHT, supra note 202, at 171.
263.

14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).

264. The decision in Martin and the later decision in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821), reaffirming the Court's appellate jurisdiction under § 25 of the First Judiciary Act, Act
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Commission's discussion of the reference jurisdiction of the National Court
of Appeals is the statement that "[t]he reference power would extend to any

case before the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari or on jurisdictional
statement; we specifically intend to include cases from the highest state
courts .
'.'.."265
The Commission's obvious purpose was to give the
National Court potential control over all conflicts in decisions on federal law
matters. The argument can be made that the review of state court decisions by
any federal court other than the Supreme Court is unconstitutional. 2" This

argument was suggested to the Commission during its hearings, but most of
the discussion was directed to the wisdom of the proposal. 267 This part of the
Article will suggest the constitutionality of the proposal, but question the
necessity for adoption of the proposal.
The Constitution does not explicitly support Supreme Court review of state
court decisions.2 68 Examination of article III, therefore, does not in itself
offer an answer to the question presented. The Constitutional Convention,

the fight for ratification, and the cases decided thereafter may be looked to for
guidance on the question of the extent of federal court control over state
courts.

A.

The Constitutional Convention

The members of the Constitutional Convention early accepted the need for
a federal check on the autonomy of the states. Submitting the Virginia Plan
for the new constitution at the opening of the Convention, John Randolph
enumerated the many defects and failures of the confederated government
which were a result of the states' protection of their sovereignty.2 69 James
Madison suggested that checks were necessary to "controul the centrifugal

tendency of the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their
proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political system."

27 0

So

clear were these facts to the Convention delegates that the Virginia Plan,
which expressly provided the national legislature with the power to "negative
all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the
of Sept. 24, 1879, ch. 20, § 25, I Stat. 73, 85, to review federal issues in state cases caused
significant controversy at the time. See I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 443-53, 547-64 (rev. ed. 1937). For a discussion of more recent controversy see H. HART
& H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 456-57 (2d ed. 1973).
265. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 32, 67 F.R.D. at 239.

266. The constitutional argument raised against the Study Group's recommendation that its
National Court of Appeals would violate the Constitution's requirement of "one supreme
Court," U.S. CONST. art. III, § I, by establishing another court to exercise the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction sparked extended commentary. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at
35-36; Black, supra note 135, at 885; Gressman, supra note 143; Freund, supra note 135, at 1310.
Although the Commission's recommendation quieted most of these critics by assuring access to
the Court in all cases, some lingering doubts have been voiced as to Congress' power under the
"exceptions and regulations" clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, to allow the Court to delegate or
assign cases to another court once the Court's jurisdiction has been invoked. See 1975 Commission Hearings 1263-66, 1319-23 (Dixon, Gressman).
267. 1974 Commission Hearings 73, 135 (Gressman, Roberts); 1975 Commission Hearings
648,699,824,929, 1017, 1238, 1264, 1305, 1323 (Kutak, Aldisert, Doyle, Haworth, Pugh, Pollak,
Dixon, Fairchild, Gressman).
268. See generally R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 223-36 (1969).
269. I M. FARRAND, RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 18-19 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
270. Id. at 165.
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.

"was passed at the outset

27
without debate or dissent. '
The means of implementing a federal check upon the states was debated
hotly later. The national legislative "negative" came under attack, sparked
by Pinckney's proposal to expand this veto further to all laws which the
national legislature should "judge to be improper." 27 2 Fearing that the "Nat'l
Legislature with such a power may enslave the States" 273 and that under such
a plan the "large States [would] crush the small ones, ' 274 delegates
introduced the New Jersey Plan that provided for one supreme tribunal and,
275
required that the state judiciary be bound by federal laws in their decisions.
The Convention finally adopted the judicial check and supremacy clause and
rejected the legislative negative. 276 Although the judicial check was strenuously opposed by Madison and Wilson, who preferred the "preventive" over
in its preference for
the "corrective" approach, the Convention stood firm 277
court rather than congressional negative on state laws.
The Convention also had a great deal of trouble agreeing about inferior
federal tribunals. 278 One side argued for reliance on state courts as the final
guardians of both state laws and constitutions against unauthorized incursions by the federal government; these state courts should yield to national
authority only where necessary to the interests of federal uniformity.279
Rutledge argued that "the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all
cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national
tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judg"280 On the other hand, some delegates favored mandatory
ments ....
inferior federal courts. Randolph stated best the fears of the nationalists that
"the Courts of the States cannot be trusted with the administration of the
are such as will often place the
National laws. The objects of jurisdiction
281
General & local policy at variance."
Although at first the nationalists appeared to win passage of the provision
for "one or more inferior tribunals, ' 282 Rutledge obtained reconsideration
of the matter, and a motion to strike out "inferior tribunals" triumphed
five-to-four with two states divided. 283 The Committee of the Whole then
passed by a vote of eight-to-two, with one state divided, a resolution "that the
271. Id. at 21, 54.
272. Id. at 164.
273. Id. at 165.
274. Id. at 167.
275. Id. at 244-45.
276. 2 id. at 28-29; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
277. 1 FARRAND 164-66; R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 226. Jefferson wrote to Madison on
June 20, 1787: "Would not an appeal from the State judicatures to a federal court be as effectual a
remedy [as the legislative negative]?" Id. at 227 n.25, quoting C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1925).
278. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 612 (1953).
279. R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 263.

280. 1 FARRAND 124. See also Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 65 (1923). Although Pinckney recorded Rutledge as being "of the
opinion that it would be right to make the adjudications of the State judges appealable to the
national judiciary," it seems clear that his reference was to the Supreme Court only, because the
provision for inferior federal courts had just been dropped. I FARRAND 125.
281.

2 FARRAND 46.

282.
283.

1 id. at 95.
Id. at 125.
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National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals. 28 4 After
285
some debate this resolution was adopted by the Convention without dissent
and was a compromise between the two contending groups, both appearing
286
content to leave the question open for Congress to resolve.
At this point note should be made that most delegates to the Convention
presumed that the state courts would have jurisdiction over federal questions. 287 The New Jersey Plan proposed the creation of only a "supreme
Tribunal" and provided that the state judiciaries were bound by federal laws
and treaties in their decisions. 288 The unstated premise of this plan was the
belief that state courts already had plenary jurisdiction to hear federal
questions. 289 There was no significant dispute at the Convention or shortly
2
afterwards that an appeal would lie from state courts to the Supreme Court . 1
Although the Supreme Court clearly was to have this power of review, the
pertinent discussions at the Convention are unclear on the scope of federal
review of state courts at a level below the Supreme Court. The compromise
nature of the provision for inferior federal courts and the concomitant lack of
necessity to flesh out the powers of those potential courts, since article I
seemed to contain ample congressional authority for future use, made further
debate unnecessary. A tantalizing motion was made and seconded, but then
withdrawn, that would have provided original jurisdiction over federal questions in the state courts "but with appeal both as to Law and fact to the courts
of the United States .... ''29 No other mention is made of this motion, an
unfortunate omission for the issue at hand, and withdrawal of the motion is of
course ambiguous evidence.
B. Ratification and the Judiciary Act
In The FederalistHamilton persuasively argued for congressional authority
to provide review of state court decisions by inferior federal tribunals and the
advantages to be obtained by so doing:
284. Id.
285. 2 id. at 46.
286. See Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 123 (1910);
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J.
498, 503 (1974). See also B. COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
LEGISLATION, BEING A COMMENTARY ON PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

342-48 (1893).
287. R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 247.
288.

I FARRAND 244, 245; R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 247.

289. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 608 (J. Hamilton ed. 1868) (A. Hamilton):
[The United States] may not commit the decisions of causes arising upon a
particular regulation to the federal courts solely . . .; but I hold that the state
courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction .... and I am
even of opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by
the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of
the causes to which those acts may give birth.
290. See R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 270-72. Corwin's conclusion after reviewing the
discussions was that:
Nothing could be plainer than the purport of the discussion and of these votes,
namely that jurisdiction in the first instance of causes of this kind specified in the
Constitution of the United States, with subsequent appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, was the maximum concession that was demanded in the Convention by the Pro-State party.
Corwin, supra note 286, at 123. See also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 264, at 12: -[The
grounds of the Convention's actions] show unmistakably . . . that the framers contemplated the
review by the Supreme Court of state court decisions on matters of federal concern."
291.

2 FARRAND 424.
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But could an appeal be made to lie from the state courts, to the
subordinate federal judicatories? . . . The following considerations
countenance the affirmative. The plan of the convention, in the first
place, authorizes the national legislature 'to constitute tribunals inferior
to the supreme court.' It declares, in the next place, that 'the JUDICIAL
POWER of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court.' and
in such 'inferior courts as congress shall ordain and establish;' and it
then proceeds to enumerate the cases, to which this judicial power shall
extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the supreme court into
original and appellate, but gives no definition of that of the subordinate
courts. The only outlines described for them are, that they shall be
'inferior to the supreme court,' and that they shall not exceed the
specified limits of the federal judiciary. Whether their authority shall be
original or appellate, or both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to
the discretion of the legislature. And this being the case, I perceive at
present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state
courts, to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages
attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the
motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of
arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court. The state tribunals may then be left with a more entire
charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they may be
deemed proper, instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be
made to lie from the state courts, to district courts of the union.2 92
Relevant evidence in the fight for ratification, other than in The Federalist
and in the debate on the First Judiciary Act, is scarce. The issue fought in the
ratification conventions was whether the provision for inferior federal courts
should remain, and several amendments were proposed to delete that provision and provide an appeal from state courts to the Supreme Court.2 93 Those
attempts are ambiguous in intent, but coupled with section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which established Supreme Court review of state court decisions
in limited instances, 294 lend some support to the argument that this route, and
295
no other, was acceptable to the states.
C. Cases
The early case law is not quite as conclusive as Hamilton would lead one to
suppose. Undoubtedly, the early cases lead to the conclusion that general
federal appellate jurisdiction over state courts exists. In Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee296 Justice Story said:
292. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 289, at 609-10 (capitals in original; first emphasis in
original; second emphasis added). See also I W. CROSSKEY, supra note 278, at 654:
Thus, the existence, in the Court of full appellate power over the courts of the
states, in all the cases enumerated in Article Ill, was avowed . . . even in The
Federalist; and Hamilton, therein also argued, with complete correctness, that
Congress could, if it wished, set up inferior national courts with appellate
jurisdiction over the state courts, as well.
293. See R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 252, 273.
294. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, I Stat. 73, 85-86.

295. Legislative history relating to §25 is virtually non-existent. C. WARREN,

CONSTITUTION, ANDTHE SUPREME COURT

Judiciary Act see I ANNALS OF

CONG.

CONGRESS, THE

104 (rev. ed. 1935). For the debates in the House on the

826-66 (1789).

296. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). It should be noted that Story's views in this case as to the
mandatory nature of the establishment of federal courts and federal jurisdiction, id. at 327-32,
have been thoroughly discredited. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 264, at 13 n.46.
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But the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the
terms of the constitution to the supreme court. There can be no doubt
that congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of
which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction ...
As, then, by the terms of the constitution, the appellate jurisdiction is
not limited as to the supreme court, and as to this court it may be
exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance,
what is there to restrain its exercise over state tribunals in the enumerated cases? The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third
article to any particular courts. The words are, 'the judicial power (which
includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases,' &c., and 'in all other
cases before mentioned the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction.' It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If
the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the
letter of the
297 constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it
depends.
But in Ableman v. Booth,298 while discussing the Court's role as final arbiter
of many controversies, Chief Justice Taney suggested a quidpro quo arrangement that a National Court of Appeals ill-fits:
In organizing such a tribunal [as the Supreme Court], it is evident that
every precaution was taken, which human wisdom could devise, to fit it
for the high duty with which it was intrusted. It was not left to Congress
to create it by law; for the States could hardly be expected to confide in
the impartiality of a tribunal created exclusively by the General Government, without any participation on their part. And as the performance of
its duty would sometimes come in conflict with individual ambition or
interests, and powerful political combinations, an act of Congress establishing such a tribunal might be repealed in order to establish another
more subservient to the predominant political influences or excited
passions of the day. This tribunal, therefore, was erected, and the
powers of which we have spoken conferred upon it, not by the Federal
Government, but by the people of the States, who formed and adopted
that Government, and conferred upon it all the powers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, which it now possesses. And in order to secure
its independence, and enable it faithfully and firmly to perform its duty, it
engrafted it upon the Constitution itself, and declared that this court
297.

14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 338. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 417,421

(1821), in which the Court noted that even under the Articles of Confederation national courts

were capable of receiving appeals in all cases of capture and that under the Constitution:
The American people may certainly give to a national tribunal a supervising
power over those judgments of the state courts, which may conflict with the

constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, without converting them into
federal courts, or converting the national into a state tribunal.
See also The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 279 (1869) (emphasis added):
It seems to us also that cases of Federal cognizance, coming up from State
courts,. . . cases involving questions arising under the Constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties, or under some other Federal authority. . . are as
completely within the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, as much
so as if the cases had been originally brought in some inferior Federal court. No
other cases tried in the State courts can be brought under the appellate jurisdiction
of this court or any inferior Federal court on which appellate jurisdiction may have
been conferred.
And see The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867):
Jurisdiction, original or appellate, alike comprehensive in either case, may be
given. The constitutional boundary line of both is the same. Every variety and
form of appellate jurisdiction within the sphere of the power, extending as well to
the courts of the States as to those of the nation, is permitted.
298. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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should have appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States. So long, therefore, as this Constitution
shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it, deciding in the peaceful
forms of judicial proceeding the angry and irritating controversies between sovereignties, which in other countries have been determined by
the arbitrament of force.2 99
An argument can be advanced on the basis of Hamilton's theory in
FederalistNo. 82 that the National Court of Appeals as an inferior federal
court was assented to when the Constitution was ratified even though the
court would not meet the level of impartiality that the Supreme Court
considered itself to possess. An additional argument suggests that the policy
of uniformity underlying the theory for any federal judicial review of state
court judgments on federal matters would be promoted by a National Court of
Appeals. 3°° But a National Court of Appeals will never be the Supreme Court,
either in power or prestige. Ableman suggests, in addition to the more obvious
problem of permitting Congress power to destroy the court upon the failure to
respond the way Congress deems appropriate,3 ' that no tribunal other than
the Supreme Court is able to give the states the impartial adjudication that
their sovereignty deserves, and that the states in ratifying the Constitution
consented to nothing less. The acceptance of the judicial check and of judicial
review by the Supreme Court in article III cases also supports the thesis.
Hamilton's suggestion that the original or appellate jurisdiction of the inferior
courts is determinable by Congress is correct but says nothing of the matter at
issue. The implied authority to provide appellate jurisdiction might well be
limited to cases brought originally in federal court. To argue that the framers,
having provided the Supreme Court to maintain federal supremacy and
uniformity, satisfied the need of the new government and satisfied the
pro-state faction is equally easy.30 2 There was no need to subject the states to
further control.
Two other lines of authority may be used to justify appellate review of
state court decisions by a National Court of Appeals. First are the removal of
statutes. 03 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee3° Justice Story said that removal
jurisdiction is a form of appellate jurisdiction. 30 5 This argument is tenuous
299. Id. at 521.
300. There is an "obvious interest, if for no other reason than uniformity of application, in
having federal law construed as well as declared by an institution of the general government." A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 10 (1962). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.

(I Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816), stating as an important motive for federal review:
[The] necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States,
upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. . . . If there were no
revising authority to control these jarring and discordant [state court] judgments
. . . into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states. . . . The public mischiefs that
would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be
believed that they could have escaped the enlightened convention which formed
the constitution.
301. History teaches that life tenure of judges does not protect a court from being abolished.

Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other

grounds, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (abolition of circuit courts); F. FRANKFURTER & J.
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 166-73 (1928) (abolition of Commerce Court).

302. See authorities cited at note 290 supra.
303. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-47 (1970).
304. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
305. The argument was:
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and has been seriously questioned. 3°6 A second argument is that a habeas

corpus proceeding, especially under the expansive interpretations of the
writ set down in Brown v. Allen3

7

and Fay v. Noia,3 °8 is lower federal court

appellate review of a state court decision. 309 The Court's theory of decision in
Fay was grounded on the writ's acting upon the body of the petitioner, not as
revision of the state court judgment. 310 Justice Harlan observed in dissent,
however, that if the writ is granted the result is nonetheless nullification of
311
the state court judgment.

Although the argument that review by a Supreme Court independent of
congressional pressure was what the states and the people bargained for,

Hamilton's argument, which seems based primarily on the article I power of
Congress to establish inferior tribunals, 312 is sufficient to carry the day.
Congress probably possesses the power to provide appellate jurisdiction in

the National Court of Appeals to review federal issues in state-tried cases. 31 3
Whether Congress should do so, however, is an entirely different question.
At least ten witnesses before the Hruska Commission discussed the pro-

posal.3 14 Perhaps that number is significantly lower than one would expect
considering the controversies that have surrounded even Supreme Court
This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of the
constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power necessary
and proper to carry into effect some express power. . . . [I]t presupposes an
exercise of original jurisdiction to have attached elsewhere. . . . If then the right
of removal be included in the appellate jurisdiction, it is only because it is one
mode of exercising that power, and as Congress is not limited by the constitution
to any particular mode, or time of exercising it, it may authorize a removal either
before or after judgment. .... [A]nd if the appellate power by the constitution
does not include cases pending in state courts, the right of removal. . . cannot be
applied to them.
Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added). But see The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869),
holding that removal of a jury-tried case after judgment to federal court for a retrial violated the
seventh amendment.
306. See Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 287 (1871):
We may doubt, with counsel, whether such removal [from state to federal court]
before issue or trial can properly be called an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It
may, we think, more properly be regarded as an indirect mode by which the
Federal court acquires original jurisdiction of the causes.
307. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
308. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
309. One commentator said that the writ after Fay represents "a transfiguration from a
concept for collateral review to a concept for appellate review." Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-Sac:
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 50 A.B.A.J. 629,634 (1964); cf. P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 241, at 116, where the authors propose to have state
supreme court criminal cases reviewed directly by the regional courts of appeal.
310. 372 U.S. at 430-31.
311. Id. at 469 (dissenting opinion). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,510(1953) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.):
Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal district courts to entertain claims that
State Supreme Courts have denied rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, it is not a case of a lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court.
It is merely one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
whereby federal law is higher than State law. It is for the Congress to designate
the member in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary to express the higher law.
312. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
313. Accord, Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need
for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 948 (1976). The problem of whether
issues of state law could also be reviewed is beyond the scope of this discussion. See Murdock v.
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). SeegenerallyC. WRIGHT, supra note 202, § 107, at 487-88.
The rule is that state courts "speak with final authority on questions of state law." Id. at 488. But
see 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 278, chs. 23-26.
314. See note 267 supra.
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review of state court decisions." 5 For an issue so fraught with the emotionalism of division of power between the states and the federal government,
maybe the surprising aspect of the proposal was the failure to draw more
attention.
The burden of persuasion facing proponents of federal review was
demonstrated during the hearings in a statement by Justice Samuel Roberts
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
A proposal for direct review of decisions of the highest state court by any
federal tribunal other than the Supreme Court of the United States will be
greeted with less than enthusiasm by state judges. It is a drastic change
and one which should be pursued only after the strongest of justifications
and only after we are certain that31it6 will further the proper relationship
between state and federal courts.
To meet this challenge for justification, the Commission's report said only
that the National Court should have the power to review state cases referred
by the Supreme Court. The report declined to emphasize a study of Supreme
Court review of state court decisions by Professor Stolz or his conclusion that
"[i]t is not possible today for the United States Supreme Court to
maintain more than token supervision of the resolution of federal law
questions by the state courts." 317 The Commission declined to accept the
proposition with
Stolz study because of the difficulty of proving "this
318
objective data and objective assessments will differ.1
An examination of the data shows why proof of the proposition is so
difficult. To reach the conclusion offered one must accept as true on the
scantiest of evidence an unsupported hypothesis. For example, on the
assumption that state court litigation has increased about as rapidly as
population, and that the percentage of state cases that raise federal issues
had remained about the same, Stolz concluded that the universe of state
cases available for but not receiving federal review has increased. At the
same time, the number of state cases on the Supreme Court docket was not
the probable reason the realization by lawyers of
increasing. Stolz asserts as 319
the futility of the exercise.
The premises on which this entire argument is based are open to serious
question. First, doubt exists whether litigation is tied in any way to population; at least this was the conclusion of a recent study of the Supreme Court's
own caseload. 3 0 Second, although the conclusion that the percentage of
state cases presenting federal issues is not declining may be more reasonable
than other explanations, over the years gaining access to federal court
315. Prior to the Civil War seven states denied the right of the Supreme Court to review their
decisions, eight legislatures adopted resolutions protesting this power of the Court, and at least
ten bills were introduced in Congress to deprive the Court of that jurisdiction. See Warren,
Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1,3-4 (1913). More recent controversy
is summarized in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 264, at 456-57.
316. 1974 Commission Hearings 135.
317. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 8 n.8, 67 F.R.D. at 212 n.8, quoting from study by Professor
Preble Stolz; see Stolz, supra note 313, at 959.
318.

COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 8 n.8, 67 F.R.D. at 212 n.8.

319. Stolz, supra note 313, at 958.
320. Casper & Posner, supra note 124, at 360.
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certainly has become easier. Today nearly any case arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States can be brought originally
in the federal district court.32 ' This might explain, for example, the slight
decline in the percentage of state civil cases appearing on the paid appellate
docket.322 Third, no evidence shows that the workload of state courts has
dramatically increased.3 23 Fourth, until 1962 state cases constituted an
increasing share of Supreme Court filings, but between 1962 and 1972 the
absolute figures did not show a marked decline, although the percentage
did.3 24 This time-span reflects almost exactly the explosion in criminal
dockets brought about by increased habeas corpus filings and providing
paid counsel in federal criminal litigation. 325 Fifth, the decline in the number
of opinions issued dealing with state court cases is not unprecedented in the
actions of the Supreme Court in previous years,3 26 and may be consistent
with the shift in the Supreme Court to adjudications of federal constitutional
328
issues, 3 27 which appear equally well in state or federal litigation.
321. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342-43 n.2 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Fortas is able to cite only cases involving state or federal unconstitutional action as falling
within the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 133 l(a) (1970). The decision in Lynch
v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), removed the state action problem by opening up 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) to personal and property right actions. One other possible exception is
cases based on federal common law. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
322. Casper & Posner, supra note 124, at 351, show a decline from 19% in 1957 and 1958 to
15.7% in 1971 and 1972. Stolz, supra note 313, at 956.
323. Stolz's figures show a relatively stable docket in the California appellate courts since
1969. Stolz, supra note 313, at 953. This is not to suggest that the number of appeals in state courts
has not increased dramatically over the last 15 years. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 241, at 4-5.
324. Stolz's figures show a gradual increase in the percentage of state court cases filed in the
Supreme Court from 44.5% (526 out of 1182) in 1948 to 49.5% (965 of 2161) in 1962, and then a
decline to 26.1% (904 of 3461) in 1972. Stolz, supra note 313, app. at 978.
325. In 1962 there were 2,948 prisoner petitions filed in the district courts; in 1972 this total
was 16,267. A.O. ANN. REP. 119 (1972).
326. Stolz shows that in 1972 the Supreme Court reviewed 23 state court cases. In 1951 it was
22 and in 1959 it was 17. Stolz, supra note 313, at 951.
327. It has been estimated that Supreme Court decisions are now comprised of one-half to
two-thirds constitutional issues. COMMISSION, STRUCTURE 8, 67 F.R.D. at 212.
328. Building on his shaky and unproved premise, Stolz proposes to create obligatory review
of all state cases properly raising a federal question. One's first reaction to this proposal is to try
to grasp the magnitude of the workload envisioned for this new court. As Stolz admits, "there
seems to be no way of estimating the universe of potential cases." Stolz, supra note 313, at 975.
Certainly this is so for state civil cases that raise federal issues. But Professor Carrington, in
analyzing the probable caseload for any new national court, suggests that there may be 25,000
criminal appeals per year in the state system, and, with appropriate reductions, the caseload of a
National Court might be 3,000-10,000 cases, "with the probabilities favoring a lower number
within that range." Carrington, Federal Appellate Caseloads and Judgeships: Planning Judicial
Workloads for a New National Forum, 4 Appellate Justice: 1975, supra note 34, at 168, 171-72.
Such a caseload, which must be expanded to include civil litigation, is clearly unmanageable from
the start. That caseload is comparable to that of the Supreme Court or to the Fifth Circuit, but the
new court would not have the luxury of controlling its own docket as does the Supreme Court,
and unless one wants a court of "jumbo" size to begin with, the caseload might be oppressive. If a
discretionary review is substituted for a mandatory one, the benefits expected in habeas
corpus-a substantial decline in collateral review of state court decisions with the advent of the
reality of direct federal review-would not accrue. In fact, contrary to the assertions of several
commentators, see Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 598, 604 (1974), Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to
Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 576,690 (1974), and
Gibbons, Book Review, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 564 (1973), that federal review would import finality
into criminal litigation, there is no assurance that this would occur. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 264, at 1513-14. Finally, a new court with such a tremendous workload could hardly be
expected to perform the other duty expected of it-to maintain uniformity of decision among the
federal courts of appeals.
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Balanced against this equivocal evidence is the importance of maintaining
a proper balance in federal-state relations, continuing confidence in and
respect for state courts, and avoiding friction in the maintenance of dual
court systems in our federal union. Clearly the Commission had hoped to
provide empirical evidence that the need existed, but none was provided.
Thus, the Commission's recommendation fails to meet the correct burden of
proof set out by Justice Roberts. 3 9 There is little need for a gratuitous
intrusion by a court, simply from its placement in the federal appellate
hierarchy, that will never have the prestige of the Supreme Court. No
citation to empirical studies or scholarly works would prove or disprove the
point, but one must feel that the introduction of such review would denigrate
state supreme courts. This would be a step backward at a time when the
Supreme Court is continuing to rely upon the state courts as vindicators of
federal constitutional rights, 330 and institutions such as the National Center
for State Courts are vitally interested in improving the quality of justice in
those courts. The notion that the strain would eventually disappear 33' hardly
justifies the initial invasion. This unprecedented reallocation of review
should be debated at length before any change is made.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress must do something. The condition of several courts of appeals is
critical and calls for immediate relief. At the expenditure of more than half a
million dollars, Congress sought the advice of a distinguished group
appointed by each branch of government. Their recommendations seem
headed for the fate suffered by most other recent commissions. Their labors
may have produced a mouse, but after the Study Group controversy, a
mouse was probably perceived as the only politically palatable animal. Now
even this product seems to be. too controversial. Unfortunately, basic
reforms are necessary before other adjustments in the present procedures,
such as increasing oral argument and opinion-writing, can be implemented.
That reform need not include an unprecedented redesign of the division of
power between the state and federal governments in a pell-mell rush to
secure uniformity of decision. Moving Congress to act eventually may be
occasioned only by the complete collapse of the courts of appeals and years
of delay in deciding appeals everywhere, not just as now in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits. That time is not far off.

329. See text accompanying note 316 supra.
330. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 n.35, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1087 n.35 (1976):
"Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal
constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
courts of the several States." See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
331. 1975 Commission Hearings 824 (Doyle).

